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INTRODUCTION

Intellectual property is usually portrayed as the law's solution to
the market's problem. Information is expensive to produce but cheap
to copy, so left to its own devices the market will fail to yield a socially
optimal volume of information goods. To overcome this underproduction problem, intellectual property offers a legal entitlement that
allows information producers to preverit unauthorized copying and
see a return on their investment. The law is thus the instrument that
corrects market failure, steering society toward an optimal, welfareenhancing output of information goods and striking the proper balance between private incentive and public benefit.
This understanding of intellectual property is certainly accurate,
as far as it goes. But in the last several years, astute observers have
recognized that the law is not the only instrument that one can use to
solve the underproduction problem for information goods.' The law
and the market do govern behavior, but so do other modalities. Indeed, the behavioral constraints that have recently garnered the most
attention in the intellectual property field are not legal or economic,
but "architectural"-i.e., imposed by the physical and technological
characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of a given good.2
Architecture has always played an important role in the development of intellectual property law, because the market failure problem
for information goods intensifies as technology reduces the cost of
reproducing and disseminating information. In other words, the architectural medium in which information is reified makes all the difference. When information technology consisted of Sanskrit and
stone tablets, an author could take comfort in the knowledge that the
1 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARv. L. REv. 501 (1999) [hereinafter Lessig, Law of the Horse] (exploring non-legal
possibilities for defining intellectual property rights); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV.
553 (1998) (recognizing that technology can form a non-legal rule structure); see also
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) [hereinafter LESSiG,
CODE] (expanding on themes from Lessig, Law of the Horse, supra).
2 Lawrence Lessig coined the term "architectural" in his seminal essay The Law of
the Horse, supra note 1. Lessig divided constraints on behavior into four categories:
laws, social norms, market forces, and architecture; the latter refers to "the physical
world as we find it, even if 'as wefind it' is simply how it has already been made." Id. at
507. Lessig and others focus on one subset of architectural constraints: "code"-the
technology of cyberspace. Id. at 509-10; Reidenberg, supranote 1 (discussing code as
behavioral constraint). Code plays a significant part in my analysis as well, but I also
examine the use of other, broader architectural modalities, such as physical possession of an object. Cf Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J.
1039 (2002) (discussing broad architectural constraints on crime).
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amount of effort required to copy the information in his or her
"book" approached the amount of effort required to write it in the
first place-an architectural fact that would deter copying. As technology advanced, however, stone tablets and chisels gave way to printing presses and ink, and the physical res in which information was
recorded became less of an impediment to copyists. Intellectual property law then stepped in, substituting a legal constraint on copying for
the diminishing architectural constraint. Indeed, one can plausibly
view the development of copyright law as a never-ending rearguard
action against technology's relentless reduction in copyists' transaction costs.

3

Intellectual property therefore solves a problem that is not purely
a result of market forces. To be sure, information's underproduction
problem manifests in the marketplace, and has traditionally found its
solution in the law, but it originates in architecture. In a pre-industrial world, we hardly see the problem at all. In the information age,
we see it in spades. 4 Today information is almost completely "de-reified"-i.e., released from the architectural constraints of a physical
medium-giving rise to the shibboleth: "Information wants to be
free." 5 Producers of information goods, of course, would disagree; in

their view, not all information wants to be free. Free information
wants to be free. Expensive information wants to make a profit.
Recognizing the threat posed by these developments in information architecture, producers of information goods have fought fire
3 For a thorough account of the interaction between technological advances and
copyright law, see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX

(rev. ed. 2003).

4 "[Tlhese new technologies have enabled the liberation of information from its
embodiment in worker or object .... [D]igitisation and the Internet [have] made
possible the separation of pure information from embodiment, allowed its transmission through a variety of media and thus offered the potential of information itself as
a commodity." Paula Baron, Databasesand the Commodification of Information, 49J. Copin old
YRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 131, 142 (2001); see also id. at 153 ("Information embedded
copy.
fixed
a
provided
and
technologies, once published, was public, irrevocable,
and
object
from
both
liberated
information,
privatised
With the new technologies,
Patterson,
Ray
L.
cf.
product.");
a
not
service,
a
become
would
media,
any particular
Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair
Competition, 17 U. DAYrON. L. Rxv. 385, 392-95 (1992) (calling copyright in compilations a "performance/service" copyright).
5 This saying is usually attributed to author, environmentalist, Merry Prankster,
and technophile Stewart Brand. See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 995, 999 n.14 (2003).
For an online etymology of the expression, see Roger Clarke, Information Wants to be
(last visited
Free, at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/II/1WtbF.html
Sept. 9, 2003).
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with fire. They have capitalized on an aspect of digital technology that
makes it unique among the architectural developments in the history
of intellectual property law: digital technology can both liberate information and enclose it. Thus digital goods are laden with code that
constrains one's ability to access them, copy them, and use them: anticopying technology in DVDs, 6 password requirements for online
content, 7 and so forth. The architectural problem has found an architectural solution, one that does not depend on the legal entitlements
of intellectual property law.8 Technology is politics by other means. 9

At the same time, producers of information goods have not relied
on technology alone to protect their investment. They have also pursued an expansion of non-architectural modalities of constraint. Proexpansionist publicity campaigns on the evils of digital piracy-complete with quotes from famous pop stars-seek to constrain behavior
by changing social norms. 10 Pro-expansionist lobbyists pressure fed6 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the Content Scramble System technology used to prevent
digital duplication of DVD content).
7 For example, the popular online services Lexis and Westlaw require users to
establish an account and use a password to access their news and legal databases. See
Lexis, at http://www.lexis.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2004); Westlaw, at http://www.west
law.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). Several prominent print publishers impose similar
conditions on online access to content more than a few days old. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES
ON THE WEB, at http://query.nytimes.com/search/advanced
(last visited Sept. 9,
2004); WALL ST. J. ONLINE, at http://online.wsj.com/public/us (last visited Sept. 9,
2004).
8 SeeJulie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudenceof Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1089, 1093 (1998) ("The same technologies that can be used to propagate information can also build fences around it.").
9 This expression originates with Clausewitz: "[W]ar is simply a continuation of
political intercourse, with the addition of other means." CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON
WAR 605 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans., 1976).
10 See, e.g., Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 743 (2003) (discussing recording industry's "Sound-Byting" publicity campaign to change attitudes of college students towards copyright); Frank Ahrens, Stars Come Out Against Net Music
Piracy in New Ads, WASH. PosT, Sept. 26, 2002, at A22 (reporting on Recording Industry Association of America anti-piracy advertising campaign that features quotes from
Britney Spears, Stevie Wonder, Luciano Pavarotti, Eminem, and others). Social
norms are one of the four categories of behavioral constraints that Lawrence Lessig
identified in The Law of the Horse, along with laws, market forces, and architecture. See
Lessig, Law of the Horse, supra note 1, at 507. An example of a social norm is plagiarism: no rule of law prohibits me from using a fellow professor's idea without attribution, but social pressure-in the form of academic contempt for plagiaristsnonetheless keeps me from doing so. To prove that this social norm does in fact
constrain my behavior, I shall now give the citation for the plagiarism example: William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18J. LEGAL
STUD. 325, 331 (1989); see also Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism,Norms, and the Limits of Theft
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eral and state legislatures for enhanced legal entitlements in the form
12
1
of lengthened copyright terms, favorable changes to contract law,
and new intellectual property rights in databases and other collections
of information. 13
The most controversial aspect of the pro-expansionists' reaction
to the digital dilemma, however, has been a combination of the technological and the legislative-an approach one might call
"technolegical," as it involves the legislative regulation of technological
14 Realizing the imporbehavior in the market for information goods.
tance of technological access controls, anticopying software, and the
Law: Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property
Rights, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 195-235 (2002) (discussing constraints on plagiarism
and exploring their meaning for intellectual property law).
11 This lobbying effort was successful. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (extending the copyright term for
future and existing works by twenty years).
12 The pro-expansionists have met with mixed success in their efforts to reform
contract law. They have secured several favorable judicial opinions, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that terms sent inside the
packaging of a computer, which stated that they governed sale unless computer was
returned within thirty days, were binding on the buyer, who did not return the computer); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
shrink-wrap licenses are enforceable unless the terms are objectionable on grounds
applicable to contracts in general), but attempts to achieve an advantageous uniformity in state law on the licensing of digital information goods have instead polarized the
debate, with two states enacting the pro-expansionist Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA), see MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I §§ 22-101 to -816 (2003);
VA. CODE ANN. § 43 (Michie 2003), and four others passing legislation that makes
voidable any choice-of-law provision that seeks to have a contract interpreted under
UCITA, see IOWA CODE § 554D.104(4) (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 (2003); W.
VA. CODE § 55-8-15 (2003); 2003 Vt. Acts & Resolves 44 (to be codified at VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 2463a). Indeed, the drafters of UCITA have signaled their pessimism
about the legislation's future: in August 2003 they decided to "not expend any additional . . . energy or resources in having UCITA adopted." Letter from K. King Burnett, President, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, to his
Fellow Commissioners 2 (Aug. 1, 2003), available at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/
ucita/KKB_UCITA_-Letter_8103.pdf.
13 These efforts are still ongoing: in early 2004, two rival database bills emerged
from two congressional committees, although neither proceeded any further in the
108th Congress. See 150 CONG. REc. D175 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2004) (ordering reporting of Consumer Access to Information Act of 2004, H.R. 3872, 108th Cong. (2004),
from House Energy and Commerce Committee); 150 CONG. REC. D1I (daily ed. Jan.
21, 2004) (ordering reporting of Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2003), from House Judiciary Committee).
These bills were the latest in a long line of legislative attempts to regulate databases
and other collections of information. See infra Part II.A.
14 Some of my colleagues have asked me how this new term "technolegical" is to
be pronounced. My first reaction is always to answer: "Rarely." But if one does want

1uo
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like, the pro-expansionists have sought legal protection for these architectural constraints. Thus we have "technolegical" enactments like
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which imposes civil
and criminal liability on those who circumvent technological measures designed to control access to a copyrighted work.1 5
Those opposed to this pro-expansionist campaign have not remained silent. They have strongly (although rarely successfully) objected to the establishment of new intellectual property entitlements
like the extension of the copyright term1 6 and strong sui generis
database rights. 1 7 These anti-expansionists have also resisted and criticized the enactment of pro-expansionist technolegical measures like
the DMCA. 18 Yet despite their clear understanding of architecture's
to say it out loud, I suggest pronouncing it just like "technological" except with
"ledge" in the middle rather than "lodge"-i.e., tek-no-LEDGE-i-cull.
15 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103(a), 112 Stat.
2860, 2863-76 (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (a) (West 2003)). A more recent example of a pro-expansionist technolegical measure is the Federal Communication Commission's "broadcast flag" rule, which requires certain consumer electronics devices to
incorporate technology designed to work with anti-piracy code built into digital
broadcasts. Digital Broadcast Content Protection, 68 Fed. Reg. 67,599 (Dec. 3, 2003)
(to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 73, 76).
16 The anti-expansionists lost this battle in the Supreme Court. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of the copyright term extension for existing works).
17 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 440-46 (1999) (criticizing the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act); Jessica Litman, After Feist, 17 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 607, 612 (1992) (arguing that even given strong sui generis
rights,
database owners would still seek to control access to data); Malla Pollack, The Right to
Know?: DelimitingDatabaseProtection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual
Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDozo ARTS & ENr. L.J. 47, 99-111
(1999) (criticizing the DMCA on grounds that it favors copyright owners over users);
J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 51, 113-36 (1997);J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, DatabaseProtection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and TheirImpact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 793, 799-821 (1999) (arguing that new sui generis database rights would be damaging to science and education).
18 See, e.g.,
Benkler, supra note 17, at 414-29 (criticizing the DMCA); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001) (opposing the DMCA on the
grounds that it serves private rather than public interests); David Nimmer, A Riff on
FairUse in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 673, 726-42 (2000)
(questioning the viability of the fair use doctrine under the DMCA). But see Jane C.
Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L.
REv. 1613, 1619 (2001) ("The technological measures that reinforce legal control may
enable and encourage authorial entrepreneurship, because authors may be able to
rely on these measures to secure the distribution of and payment for their works.").
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importance as a behavioral constraint in the information age, antiexpansionists offer almost no affirmative technolegical measures of
their own. They decry attempts to use architecture as an instrument
of enclosure, but make few efforts to bolster its use as an instrument
of liberation. They recognize the threat of technolegical enactments,
19
but not their promise. Anti-expansionists play defense.
It is hard to say why anti-expansionists are not more aggressive in
using the law to produce architectural results that favor their policy
outcomes. They have no trouble understanding the importance of
architectural constraints to intellectual property law; indeed, it was an
anti-expansionist who first articulated the distinction between law and
architecture. 20 The more likely explanation is that anti-expansionists
are simply reluctant to regulate technology, even in the service of
their policy goals. They are willing to remove legal impediments to
freedom of information, but not architectural ones. Using the law to
regulate technology smells too pro-expansionist.
Another possibility is that anti-expansionists believe that a world
of unregulated technology will yield a socially optimal outcome. Implicit in this belief is the assumption that, as long as there are no proexpansionist technolegical measures like the DMCA in place, intellectual property law's public/private balance of legal entitlements will
have its intended effect. This is hardly certain, and in fact is probably
not true. In the absence of technolegical measures, digital architecture becomes a Wild West of technological one-upmanship that favors
19 A notable exception is Dan Burk's and Julie Cohen's Fair Use Infrastructurefor
Rights Management Systems, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001), which proposes a
technolegical framework designed to give meaning to copyright's fair use doctrine.
And Jessica Litman has recently suggested that the law should enforce a default rule
favoring online music sharing by giving legal status to a particular digital file format.
Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing 39-42 (Apr. 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author), available at http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman/papers/sharing&
stealing.pdf. Cohen has also suggested technolegical measures that would limit the
information that content providers can collect about those reading their goods, but
her proposal is designed to protect online privacy rather than preserve intellectual
property law's balance between private incentive and public benefit. SeeJulie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace,
28 CONN. L. Riv. 981, 1031-38 (1996) (advocating legislation to "outlaw intrusive,
anonymity-destroying practices by copyright owners"); see also Julie E. Cohen, DRM
and Privacy, 18 BERK ELEY TECH. LJ. 575, 613-16 (2003) [hereinafter Cohen, DRM]
(suggesting that the law should encourage technological standards that protect privacy); cf. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rrv. 1 (2004) (arguing that technological regulation is key to promoting free-speech values in the digital era).
20 See Lessig, Law of the Horse, supranote 1, at 507-08 (explaining the difference
between law and architecture).

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

(VOL. 8o: 1

the better technologist. If it is easier to enclose than liberate, information producers prevail, and public entitlements fall by the wayside. If
it is easier to liberate than enclose, hackers prevail, and private incentive is undermined. In either case, legal modalities-no matter how
carefully constructed-will have a reduced impact, or none at all.
In this Article, I argue that this reluctance on the part of antiexpansionists to embrace technolegical measures is a mistake and represents a missed opportunity. Technolegical regulation is critical to
giving true meaning to intellectual property law's legal entitlements.
In making this point, I focus on one front in the current battle over
the expansion of intellectual property rights: whether databases and
other collections of information should be the subject of a new set of
legal entitlements. The database debate is an instructive case study
for several reasons. First, it is a clean slate-an area in which intellectual property entitlements do not yet exist 2 1 and direct technolegical

measures have yet to be implemented. 22 It is accordingly an area in
which policymakers have a great deal of flexibility, and in which proexpansionists might be willing to trade technolegical restrictions for
new legal rights. 23 Second, digital architecture affects databases in a
21 One might argue that because facts are excluded from copyright's coverage,
see Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-46 (1991) (stating that
facts are not copyrightable because they are not original), intellectual property law
has created an implicit entitlement here, i.e., that legal rights in factual data default
to the public. Assuming this is the case, it simply illustrates the need for technolegical
measures: if database developers place technological obstacles in the public's path, so
that it cannot access the facts in the databases, its legal entitlement to those facts is
meaningless. (In any event, no one in the database debate has suggested any private
entitlement in facts themselves; the focus is on protecting the effort expended in
compiling facts in a database. See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.) In
some instances state misappropriation law also protects factual compilations, but its
narrow scope and susceptibility to federal preemption renders it relatively ineffective
as an intellectual property regime. See Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105
F.3d 841, 848-54 (2d Cir. 1997) (analyzing partial preemption and holding that "only
a narrow 'hot-news' misappropriation claim survives preemption for actions concerning material within the realm of copyright").
22 Although no existing technolegical measure was specifically designed to buttress a database entitlement, there are two technolegical statutes on the books that
might nonetheless aid database developers. See infra Part II.C.1.
23 Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 156 (noting that "database publishers ...have now staked a claim to subject matter that world intellectual property law
had left unprotected as a building block of scientific and technological progress" and
should therefore be willing to give "a measure of support for the public-good uses" of
their products); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis
Protectionof Databasesin the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 152 (1997)
("[E]xtra-copyright protection may be so effective that sui generis regulation [of
databases] may afford a desirable readjustment of the balance between incentives to
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unique way. When a collection of data assumes digital form, it becomes simultaneously more valuable to society, more vulnerable to
market failure, and less viable as a subject of existing legal modalities.
This means that there is a good case for database rights in the digital
world. Indeed, even most anti-expansionists support the enactment of
some entitlement; the question is scope, not subsistence. 24 Finally,
enough that social norms do
the database market is new and diffuse
25
behavior.
not significantly constrain
Part I of this Article demonstrates how market forces, intellectual
property law, and digital architecture have conspired to make the case
for a new intellectual property entitlement for database developers.
Part II discusses how digital architecture threatens to obviate any entitlements that are enacted, describes existing and proposed pro-expansionist technolegical measures that already pose threats to sound
database policy, and rebuts the notion that these architectural and
technolegical measures will result in welfare-enhancing price discrimiproduce initial compilations, and access to create new, and especially derivative, information products."); Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing Private Rights and Public Policies:
Reconceptualizing Property in Databases, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773, 787 (2003) ("De-

signing a new database model that uses property rights to limit a database producer's
ability to create market monopolies may be the most effective way to prevent database
makers from using contractual and technological measures to create property rights
that are impervious to any competing uses of the information.").
Patterson, supra note 4, at 407-10 (asserting that factual collections
24 See, e.g.,
should be afforded protection for a limited time, against competitors only, not encompassing the contents of the work, and "subject to forfeiture for predatory pricing"); Pollack, supra note 17, at 123-44 (advocating statutory protection that would
protect only databases at risk of market failure); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note
17, at 137-51 (suggesting unfair competition and modified liability approaches to
database protection). Of course, sometimes the best legislative solution to market
failure is to pass no legislation at all. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. &
ECON. 1, 18 (1960) ("All solutions have costs and there is no reason to suppose that
government regulation is called for simply because the problem is not well handled
by the market or the firm."). In this case, however, architecture (if left unregulated)
will solve the problem itself, and not in a way that serves social welfare. See infra Part
II.B. Some regulation of architecture through technolegical measures is therefore
necessary, and the most plausible way to enact that regulation is as part of a database
entitlement. See infra Part III.
25 Some segments of the database market do follow important social norms, such
as the tradition of sharing data freely among scientists and researchers. See J.H.
Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific
Data in a Highly ProtectionistIntellectual PropertyEnvironment, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.

315, 322-24 (2003) (describing the scientific community's "sharing ethos"). The
technolegical tool of re-reification, however, might allow such communities to opt out
of new legal entitlements and technolegical restrictions and instead continue to govern themselves. See infra Part III.B.
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nation. Finally, Part III evaluates how various anti-expansionist
technolegical tools can be used to resolve the main issues in the
database debate. The most promising tool in the technolegical toolbox is what I call re-reification: requiring each database developer to
reduce its database to a technologically unfettered, freestanding medium-an accessible, physical res-and to deposit a copy of the
database in that form with a central clearinghouse. The timing and
breadth of public access to this re-reified copy would vary depending
on the legal entitlements that emerge from the database debate, but
in every case the independent existence of the freestanding version
would act as a check on the developer's ability to use architectural
constraints to override those entitlements. Re-reification is thus a
technolegical tool flexible enough to give meaning to whatever legal
rights-strong or weak-policymakers adopt. It merely impedes the
ability of database developers to achieve technologically what they are
not given legally.
I.

EXISTING BEHAVIORAL CONSTRAINTS IN THE DATABASE MARKET

In the last dozen years, a confluence of economic, legal, and architectural forces has given rise to a debate over whether databases
and other organized compilations of information should be the subject of a new regime of intellectual property protection. Understanding the interaction of these diverse and discrete behavioral constraints
is necessary to understanding how a coherent resolution of the
database debate must include direct regulation of the architectural
aspects of databases. The following discussion therefore examines the
market problem that databases face, the absence of any existing legal
solution, and the exacerbating effect that the modern architecture of
databases has had on the problem.
A.

Market Modalities: The Public Goods Problem

The case for database protection rests on the notion that market
forces alone will produce a suboptimal number of database products
from the standpoint of overall social welfare. 26 This market failure
results because information is a public good. Public goods have two
26

See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 106-349, at 9-10 (1999) (articulating a legislative need

to "protect developers against piracy and unfair competition, and thus encourage
continued investment in the production and distribution of valuable commercial collections of information"); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 197-99 (advocating for a sui
generis law to "achieve a desired level of innovation" in databases); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 137 (stating that legal protections are required to avert market failure and yield net social benefits).
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defining characteristics. First, they are nonexcludable: once they are
made public, their producer cannot readily control who can and cannot use them. Second, they are nonrival: one user can enjoy a public
27
The
good without depleting any other user's ability to do so as well.

28
light from a lighthouse is a common example of a public good.
Once the light is publicly available-i.e., once it is turned on-the
lighthouse owner will be unable to prevent any given ship from using
the light in its navigation. The light is therefore nonexcludable. And
one ship's use of the light does not diminish the light available for the
next ship to use. The light is therefore nonrival.
Nonexcludability poses problems for the production of public
goods. If the lighthouse owner lacks the ability to exclude ships from
using the light, he or she lacks the ability to demand fees from those
ships, and therefore cannot recoup the expense of building the lighthouse in the first place. So even if the cost of building and maintaining the lighthouse is less than the value it provides to local shippingi.e., even if its construction would increase overall social welfare-the
lighthouse's nonexcludability will prevent its construction. A socially
inefficient result obtains.
The nonrival nature of public goods also leads to market inefficiencies. A perfectly nonrival good's marginal cost of production
(and therefore its socially efficient price) is zero, because its producer
incurs no cost in making the good available to an additional user.
Charging a price greater than zero will thus result in suboptimal production-yet the producer will have to charge a price greater than
zero if it is to recoup the initial cost of creating the good. So even if

27 Thomas Jefferson eloquently explained these concepts in a discussion of the
ephemeral nature of ideas:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive
property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an
individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the
moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone, and the
receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no
one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who
receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening
mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening
me.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THE COMPLETE
JEFFERSON 1011, 1015 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943).
28 See, e.g., MICHAEL PARKIN, MICROECONOMIcS 372 (6th ed. 2003). For a detailed
discussion of the real-world economics of lighthouses, see R. H. Coase, The Lighthouse
in Economics, 17J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974) (focusing on historical practice and challenging conventional wisdom that public construction and maintenance is the only viable
solution to this public goods problem).
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our lighthouse owner can somehow make the light excludable and
collect fees, some ships that would benefit from the light will be unwilling or unable to pay the price the owner charges. From the standpoint of social welfare, excluding such ships from the use of the
nonrival good represents an inefficient "deadweight loss."29

Data pose the same public goods problem as our hypothetical
lighthouse. The developer of i database may expend substantial time
and effort in researching and assembling the data. Once a single copy
of the database is published, however, the developer has little ability
to exclude anyone from making and distributing competing copies,
and the price it can demand will therefore quickly be driven down
toward the marginal cost of producing copies.30 Yet at that price, the
developer may not be able to recover the investment made in the initial compilation, and will therefore have no incentive to produce the
database in the first place. A database-or, more precisely, the information contained therein-is also the sort of good that one user can
enjoy without depleting the supply available for others. 3 1 Any price
much above zero will result in suboptimal production and deadweight
loss, even though the developer may have to charge a higher "recoupment price" in order to recover its compilation costs.
B.

Legal Modalities: Maps, Charts, and Databases

The preceding discussion shows that the market alone fails to
bring about the efficient production of public goods, whether we are
talking about lighthouses or databases. For information goods, the
primary solution to this underproduction problem has been a system
29

A deadweight loss is a reduction in social welfare resulting from a market inef-

ficiency. See

STEVEN

E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 253 (5th ed.

2002). Part II.D of this Article discusses the extent to which architectural modalities
can empower producers to use price discrimination to remedy the problem of deadweight loss.
30 "Because the demand for accuracy usually makes the cost of producing information works high while modem technology tends to make the effort in copying
them low, the profits of first-movers are at considerable risk, absent some form of
legal protection." Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy's Approach to Information Products: Muscling Copyright and Patent into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 Sup.
CT. REV. 195, 197; see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of IntellectualProperty, 88 VA. L. REv. 1455, 1458-59 (2002) ("The cost of
copying innovative products and original expressive works is invariably lower than the
cost of producing them initially, and in a competitive market the price will be driven
down to the marginal cost of copying.") (footnote omitted).
31 It is for this reason that I use the term "user" rather than "consumer" when
discussing information goods; their nonrival nature means that they are not "consumed" upon use.
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of private legal entitlements-intellectual property rights. These entitlements allow the producer of an information good to prohibit certain uses of the good while the right lasts. For example, anyone who
copies a novel without the author's permission will be subject3 2 to a

judgment for damages and an injunction under copyright law.

In other words, intellectual property uses a legal modality to convert a nonexcludable good into a partly excludable good, thus giving
the producer the power to inhibit competition from copyists. It is accordingly the instrument with which the law achieves the improvement in social welfare that nonexcludability obstructed. 33 With
information goods rendered partly excludable, private parties have an
incentive to produce and disseminate them, secure in the knowledge
that the law will support their efforts to recoup the expense they incurred in creating the goods. And the public at large benefits from
valuable products that would otherwise not be available. 34 This system
of entitlements also partly solves the problem of nonrival goods and
deadweight loss, as those who value the information good at less than
32 Assuming that the threshold requirements for copyright law are met, see 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000), making an unauthorized copy of the novel would violate the
copyright owner's exclusive right of reproduction, id. § 106(1). As to remedies, see
id. §§ 502 (injunctive relief), 504 (damages).
33 See Yochai Benkler, ConstitutionalBounds of DatabaseProtection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 535, 577 (2000) ("The economic function of intellectual property rights is
to provide the legal entitlement that makes information goods partly excludable.").
34 This description of intellectual property law follows the American model,
which focuses on improving social welfare, and which is enshrined in the Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the
power "[t] o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries"). Intellectual property law in other countries, and particularly in Europe, tends to derive more from Lockean labor theory and notions of authors' rights
than from the utilitarian approach described here. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 3-4 (2001) ("The tradition of author's rights is rooted in the civil
law system and prevails in the countries of the European continent and their former

colonies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia."). But see id. at 4 (finding similarities
between the two approaches in practice on important points); Jane C. Ginsburg, A
Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L.
REV. 991 (1990) (examining origins of French and American copyright systems and
concluding that their underlying principles have much in common). And even
within the United States, commentators disagree about how extensive intellectual
property rights need to be in order to maximize social welfare. See Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 308-11 (1996) (contrasting the traditional economic incentive approach with the newer and more expansive neoclassicist approach).
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the recoupment price may acquire it in the aftermarket, 35 may use it
in a way that is not covered by the entitlement, 36 or may wait until the
37
right expires and then obtain it for free.
This system of private legal entitlements originally covered factual
works like databases. Indeed, the first federal copyright legislation,
enacted in 1790 by the First Congress, extended to only three kinds of
works, two of them factual: maps, charts, and books. 38 Copyright
therefore initially protected the explorer's careful surveying and the
mariner's painstaking soundings as much as it protected the novelist's
creative efforts. A mapmaker could legally make a map through independent authorship-i.e., by independently conducting a survey,
through the sweat of his or her own brow-but copyright law prohibited making a map by copying an existing map.3 9 Free-riding on the
efforts of another (at least without consent) was forbidden.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, however, copyright law embraced a new paradigm, one that did not focus on the labor necessary
to produce a work. Under this new paradigm, protection could be
acquired merely by expressing one's singular individuality in a work.
The manifestation of creative, subjective judgment brought the work
within the scope of copyright law, regardless of the effort expended in

35 Copyright's first sale doctrine, for example, prohibits the producer of a copyrighted good from controlling the downstream distribution of that good. 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(a) (2000). This allows libraries, used book stores, and other aftermarket outlets
to supply certain deadweight customers-those who lacked the ability or willingness
to pay the price that the producer charged.
36 Examples from copyright law include making a "fair use" of a copyrighted
work, id. § 107, or copying the idea contained within the work, id. § 102(b).
37 Depending on the nature of the entitlement, the low-value user might have to
wait a long time. Copyright protection for individually authored works currently expires seventy years after the author's death, with a similarly lengthy term for institutionally authored works. 17 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West 2004). Patent protection, in
contrast, usually lasts only twenty years. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2) (2000).
38 See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
39 E.g., Banks v. McDivitt, 2 F. Cas. 759, 760 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 961) ("The
compiler of a digest, a road book, a directory, or a map can search and survey for
himself in the fields which all laborers are permitted to occupy, but cannot adopt as
his own the products of another's toil."); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 624 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
[T]he true test of piracy or not is to ascertain whether the defendant has, in
fact, used the plan, arrangements, and illustrations of the plaintiff ... or
whether his work is the result of his own labor, skill, and use of common
materials and common sources of knowledge, open to all men.
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creating it.40 Even a momentary, inadvertent feat of personal expression-such as that caused by "bad eyesight or defective musculature"-made the resulting work uniquely the author's own, and thus
qualified it for copyright protection. 4 1 At first, this new "high authorship" paradigm coexisted with the paradigm that protected factual,
"low authorship" works like maps and charts, and each independently
provided a basis for invoking copyright. 42 Over time, however, creative authorship became the primary justification for copyright protection, and the notion of gaining protection through mere "sweat of the
brow" fell into disfavor.
The culmination of this trend was the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,43 a case
40 SeeJane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protectionof Works
of Information, 90 COLIUM. L. REv. 1865, 1881-88 (1990) (discussing the evolution of
the legal basis for intellectual property rights from labor to individualized creativity).
Justice Holmes famously captured this new paradigm in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality
always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible,
which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright unless there is
a restriction in the words of the act.
Id.
41 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951).
42 Ginsburg, supra note 40, at 1889-93. The terms "high authorship" and "low
authorship" are Ginsburg's. See id. at 1866 (using "low authorship" to describe "personality-deprived information compilations such as directories, indexes, and data bases"); id. at 1870 (using "high authorship" to describe works that manifest a subjective
authorial presence).
43 499 U.S. 340 (1991). By the time the Court granted certiorari in Feist, see 498
U.S. 808 (1990), a split had emerged between, on the one hand, the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits, which continued to use copyright law to protect the effort involved in
compiling factual works, and, on the other, the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,
which rejected this "sweat of the brow" doctrine in favor of a requirement that all
copyrighted works exhibit creative choice. CompareW. Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent.,
Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1223-27 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that the exercise of "intellectual labor" may earn a work copyright protection), and Schroeder v. William Morrow
& Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that "only 'industrious collection' . . . is
required for copyright protection"), with Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d
569, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the "sweat of the brow" theory and finding that
the defendant did not infringe when it used a copyrighted fact book as a source of
questions for its Trivial Pursuit board game), Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors
Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that copyright protection does
not depend on "the amount of effort the author expends"), and S. Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801, 809-10 & n.9 (11th Cir.
1985) (rejecting notion that "industrious collection" can result in copyright
protection).
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familiar to every law student who has studied copyright in the last decade. Rural Telephone, the plaintiff in Feist, was a local telephone
company that had compiled a print database, a typical white-pages directory of its customers. Feist Publications published its own telephone directory, which covered Rural's customer base but also
encompassed a broader geographical area. Feist offered to pay Rural
for the use of Rural's listings in this directory, but Rural refused. Feist
therefore copied some of Rural's listings without permission and integrated them into its wide-area directory.
Rural sued for copyright infringement. 4 4 The Court held for
Feist, categorically rejecting the "sweat of the brow" doctrine as a basis
for copyright protection and fixing instead on subjective, creative authorship alone as the threshold requirement:
The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright
protection, a work must be original to the author. Original, as the
term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
45
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.

According to Feist, original efforts were not enough; indeed, they
were irrelevant. Rather, original expression, in the sense of creative expression, was the key. Because facts were not subjectively created, but
objectively discovered, copyright protection could not subsist in mere
facts, no matter how great an investment had been made in their compilation. 46 The Court grounded its holding not only in the extant
copyright statute, but also in the Constitution 47-an important point,
as this meant that Congress thereafter lacked the power to protect
48
factual compilations under the Intellectual Property Clause.
44 Feist, 499 U.S. at 342-44.
45 Id. at 345 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
46 Id. at 345-48. Some scholars have questioned the validity of distinguishing
between objectively discovered facts and individually created expression. E.g., Jane C.
Ginsburg, Sabotagingand Reconstructiong [sic] History: A Comment on the Scope of Copyright
Protection in Works of History After Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 29 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y U.S.A. 647, 657-60 (1982) (debunking the "Platonic fact precept" that facts are
objective truths awaiting discovery); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J.
965, 996-97 (1990) (arguing that "facts are no more 'out there' than are plots, words,
or sculptural forms"); cf WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, THE PRELUDE, OR GROWTH OF A
POET'S MIND 53 (Ernest de Selincourt ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1926) (1850) ("[W]e
multiply distinctions, then / Deem that our puny boundaries are things / That we
perceive, and not that we have made.").
47 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346-47.
48 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. In a sense, then, Feist did us a favor. By couching its
holding in constitutional terms, the Court eliminated the possibility (perhaps the
probability) that Congress would simply amend the Copyright Act to cover databases.
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The Court's ruling did not mean that every database or other collection of facts was ineligible for copyright protection. But to qualify,
the facts had to be presented in some creative fashion, and copyright
would attach only to the manner of presentation. In other words, creativity inherent in the "selection or arrangement" of the facts in the
compilation would be protected, but not the facts themselves or the
effort expended in compiling them. 49 This sealed Rural's fate, as the
data in its listings (name, town, and telephone number) evinced no
subjectivity in their selection, and the arrangement of the listings (alphabetically by surname) was likewise "devoid of even the slightest
trace of creativity." 50 Feist was thus free to copy the listings, individu51
ally or in their entirety.
C.

ArchitecturalModalities: Exacerbatingthe Problem

Together, the public goods problem and the Feist decision mean
that current economic and legal modalities may not provide for the
optimal production of databases. At the same time, two architectural
aspects of databases, both prompted by the digitization of data products, have made the underproduction threat worse.
1.

Information Architecture and Transaction Costs

The first effect of digital technology on database protection relates to the costs of accessing, copying, and disseminating information
As it now stands, in order to protect databases Congress must create a new entitlement outside the bounds of any existing intellectual property regime, which gives it
and us an opportunity to think more deeply about the proper balance of legal entitlements, to evaluate the behavioral constraints that bear on the issue, and to demand
more of the pro-expansionist supplicants. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17,
at 156 (noting that "database publishers... have now staked a claim to subject matter
that world intellectual property law had left unprotected as a building block of scientific and technological progress" and should therefore be willing to give "a measure of
support for the public-good uses" of their products).
49 Feist, 499 U.S. at 350-51 ("A factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it
features an original selection or arrangement of facts, but the copyright is limited to
the particular selection or arrangement."); id. at 358 ("Facts are never original, so the
compilation author can claim originality, if at all, only in the way the facts are
presented.").
50 Id. at 362-63.
51 As noted supra text accompanying note 39, even if the Court had embraced
the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, Feist would have had no copyright exposure if, instead of copying Rural's listings, it had conducted its own independent collection
efforts. Feist's directory, however, contained four fictional listings that Rural had inserted into its white pages-proof positive that Feist had engaged in at least some
wholesale copying. Feist, 499 U.S. at 344.
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goods. Although information in its pure, de-reified form is nonexcludable and nonrival, and is thus vulnerable to the public goods
problem, the real-world architectural constraints of the medium in
which information is presented-the res in which it is reified-tend to
limit the extent of the problem. 52 Consider information stored in a
book. Before invention of the printing press, the amount of effort
required to copy the book's information approached the amount of
effort required to write it in the first place. The investment the copyist would have to make thus acted as a built-in, architectural disincentive against copying; although the information in the book was
nonexcludable and nonrival, the high transaction costs of copying the
book itself-the reified information-made the good moderately excludable. The architectural limitations of the early print medium thus
helped to avert market failure, even in the absence of legal
entitlements.
Since Gutenberg, however, technology has steadily reduced the
transaction costs of copying books, through such innovations as moveable type, stereotypy, linotype, photocopying, and so forth. The information in a book becomes less excludable and less rival as technology
makes it less expensive to access, copy, and disseminate. Digital technology has had this effect across the range of information goods,
bringing them ever closer to perfect nonexcludability and
nonrivalrousness. In the digital realm, information is almost completely de-reified, freed from any architecturally restrictive medium.
The negligible cost of reproducing and disseminating digital information makes exclusion difficult, and perfect, durable digital copies
make information goods nonrival in a way that relatively impermanent paper, celluloid, and vinyl never could. 53 And although this arAdam R. Fox, The Economics of Expression and the Future of Copyright Law, 25
N.U. L. REv. 5, 11 (1999) ("[I]nformation's relative exclusivity depends upon
the nature of the selected medium responsible for its communication, because that
actually determines the cost of access to the information.").
53 Of course, digital architecture does not represent the first time that information has been effectively de-reified. The first major technological assault on the reification paradigm was radio and television broadcasting. The broadcasting challenge,
however, was met by an economic model that has not proved suitable to digital goods:
information was provided to the end-user at no charge, but was "bundled" with advertising that provided the payback. See James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic
Analysis, Price Discriminationand DigitalIntellectual Property, 53 VAND.L. REV. 2007, 2016
(2000) ("By moving the business model from sale of content to viewers, to sale of
eyeballs to advertisers, the excludability problem is 'solved.'"). Only when broadcasting gave way to distribution of public programming by hard-wired cable networks did
it become possible to charge directly for the delivery of copyrighted television content-i.e., to make television an excludable information good. Despite some initial
52
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chitectural problem affects all information goods, it has had a
particular impact on those that, like databases, do not have available
many legal means to increase excludability.
2.

Disincentivizing Utility

The impact of reduced transaction costs is felt by all information
goods, but the other pertinent effect of digital technology is particular
to databases. The natural tendency for database producers in the
post-Feist world is to design their products so as to take advantage of
what little copyright law now offers them. If copyright protection only
attaches when data in factual works are selected and arranged in a
creative fashion, then database developers will seek to select and arrange their data in a way that reflects creative, subjective authorship
(or will at least argue in court that their selection and arrangement
are creative). Not surprisingly, this is what has happened in the dozen
54
years since Feist was handed down.
Even if subjective authorship were not necessary for copyright
protection, however, the developer of a database in print form might
exercise some subjectivity in designing its product. Because the architecture of the print medium forces data into a static organization, the
print compiler must necessarily engage in some guesswork as to the
assortment and presentation of facts that its audience will find most
useful. A telephone directory organized alphabetically by surname is
all well and good for the homebody who wants to find a friend's number, but the door-to-door salesman might want it organized by street
address. The fundraiser would like a telephone book that includes
data on income and assets. The demographer wants to know age and
gender. A print database that attempted to satisfy all these disparate
optimism, however, advertising has not been able to perform the same function in the
online environment as it did in broadcasting; instead, direct commodification of digital content has become the norm. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital
Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 168 (2003)
("While some have hoped that advertising would provide a sustainable revenue
stream through which digital content providers could recoup investments, this seems
a less viable long-term strategy after the dot.com bust."); The Internet Sells Its Soul,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 2002, at 65, 65 ("As the many dotcoms that have already gone
bust discovered, making money on the web is not easy-especially from advertising.").
54 See, e.g., Warren Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1517-18
(lth Cir. 1997) (en banc) (rejecting an argument for creative selection in a print
directory of communities served by cable television); EPM Communications, Inc. v.
Notara, Inc., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144, 1147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (accepting a claim
of creative selection in a sourcebook's choice of what information would be of interest
to the licensing industry).
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demands would quickly prove unwieldy, as it would contain an excess
of data, arranged over and over in multiple permutations.
Some subjective selection and arrangement of data can therefore
be a useful feature in a print directory-and if it happens to make
copyright protection more likely, so much the better for the compiler.
Yet in many cases, the most advantageous selection and arrangement
will be the least subjective, and thus the least likely to garner copyright
protection. This was the case in Feist, which found insufficient originality in white pages that selected the name and phone number of
everyone in a given geographical area and arranged that information
alphabetically by surname. 55 Such a presentation of data was "so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of course. ... It

is not only unoriginal, it is practically inevitable. '56 What Feist does for
databases, then, is create a tension between making a directory intuitive, thorough, and user-friendly on the one hand, and making it amenable to copyright protection on the other.
Digital architecture greatly exacerbates this tension. Computer
technology de-reifies data, freeing them from the static mold of the
print directory; the end-user, not the compiler, determines the arrangement. 57 Digitization also makes data products both more architecturally compact and more manageable, thereby encouraging the
inclusion of all remotely relevant information. 58 And because a digital
database's end-users can so easily filter out information that they consider irrelevant to their purposes, the developer has no reason not to
be overinclusive. Thus static arrangement is replaced by dynamic manipulation, and subjective selection by comprehensive inclusion. In
digital form, our telephone directory can include all available information-name, number, address, income, assets, age, gender, etc.and leave it to the homebody, door-to-door salesman, fundraiser, and

55 Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-63.
56 Id. at 363.
57 Information in a database "can be arranged and retrieved in variations limited
only by the capabilities of the computer and the sophistication of the retrieval program. In such a context there is no particular arrangement to protect." Robert C.
Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary

Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 531 (1981).
58 A four-and-three-quarter-inch CD can store the equivalent of 300,000 typed
pages, or up to 4.8 billion characters, depending on the compression technology
used. Sarah Laidlaw Tilevitz, Reconciling Space and Access Needs in a Small Law Firm

Library: A "Modest Proposal," 88 LAW LIBR. J. 96, 107 (1996). A single DVD can have
twenty-five times that storage capacity. Tom R. Halfhill, CDsfor the Gigaryte Era, BYrE,
Oct. 1996, at 139, 139.
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demographer to decide individually how to select and arrange the
data.

59

These architectural aspects of digital databases are a good thing
from the standpoint of overall social welfare. A database that includes
more information, while at the same time giving the end-user greater
control and discretion in extracting and using that information, is
much more valuable to society than its comparatively ineffectual print
predecessor. 60 But as databases become de-reified, they also become
even less likely to meet Feist's originality standards. It is difficult to
portray a comprehensive database as subjectively selective, 61 and it is
nearly impossible to claim that data stored in ones and zeros have any
inherent arrangement, let alone a creative one. 62 Digital technology

thus takes the thin copyright protection that factual works could as63
pire to after Feist and renders it downright anorexic.
59
In a data base, such as a catalogue of all holdings of the Library of Congress,
or an unannotated compendium of all federal appellate court decisions, the
compiler aims to be exhaustive, not selective. The utility of the data base is
its comprehensiveness; selection according to subjective criteria or intuition
would defeat the purpose. Moreover, since individual users interrogate the
data base according to their own search criteria, arrangement of data would
appear irrelevant.
Ginsburg, supra note 40, at 1900-01 n.138.
60 In fact, when a print database "goes digital," it essentially allows the creation of
a near-infinite number of derivative works. If one were to take a print directory organized by name and reorganize it by street address, the result would be a new, deivative compilation. Yet in the digital medium, the same database-as long as it was
sufficiently architecturally unfettered-would allow both manners of organization,
without the creation of a separate work. This both calls into question the need for
strong derivative rights in databases and shows how architectural constraints can inhibit innovation.
61 See, e.g., Warren Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1518 (11th
Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that selection of data in factual compilation was not
original because compiler had selected "the entire relevant universe known to it").
Interestingly, both Warren and EPM involved defendants who had converted a plaintiffs print database into digital form. See id. at 1512; EPM Communications, Inc. v.
Notara, Inc., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144, 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
62 This has not kept commentators from gamely trying to find ways to bring digital databases within Feist's requirements. See, e.g., Jack B. Hicks, Note, Copyright and
Computer Databases:Is TraditionalCompilation Law Adequate?, 65 TEX. L. REv. 993, 1014,
1022-23 (1987) (arguing that the design of digital databases involves creative arrangement because designers physically locate more popular data on that part of the digital
medium from which it can be retrieved with minimal access time).
63 Cf Key Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509,
514 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting with regard to print directory that "[w]hile, as the Court
pointed out in Feist, the 'copyright in a factual compilation is thin,' we do not believe
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The implications are troubling. The more logical and intuitive
the organization of the data, the less likely it is to secure a copyright.
The more comprehensive the assemblage of facts, the less likely it is to
receive any legal protection. The law discourages the very data products that are the most useful and valuable to the public.6 4 It disincentivizes utility.
II.

ARCHITECTURAL MODALITIES AND PRIVATE ORDERING
OF DATABASE "RIGHTS"

A.

Focusing the Debate

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the current legal modalities of intellectual property law do not provide an adequate solution to the market failure problem that databases face, and that
certain architectural aspects of digital databases serve only to exacerbate the problem. The reaction of database developers to this conundrum, not surprisingly, has been to pursue an expansion of legal
entitlements, a new public ordering of database rights. This lobbying
it is anorexic" (quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349
(1991)).
64 See Collections of Information Antipiracy Act: Hearing on H.R. 354 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intell. Prop., House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 214 (1999)
[hereinafter H.R. 354 1999 Hearing] (statement of Michael K. Kirk on behalf of Am.
Intell. Prop. L. Ass'n) ("Surely the adequacy of the existing regime for protecting
databases under copyright must be questioned when it presumably grants greater protection to a smaller, highly selective database of arguably less general utility than to a

large, all inclusive database of more general utility."); U.S.

COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT

74-75 (1997).
[I]t is precisely those databases that require the greatest amount of investment and may be the most valuable to users whose copyright status is most
doubtful: the massive, comprehensive database covering the entire universe
of a given field, produced in electronic form with the arrangement of the
data not fixed by the producer but chosen by each individual user.
Id.; Michael Steven Green, Copyrighting Facts, 78 IND. L.J. 919, 920 (2003) ("By dispensing with conventional modes of presentation, selection, and arrangement,
[databases] can easily fail to satisfy traditional standards for copyrightability, leaving
them with virtually no legal protection against copying."); John F. Hayden, Recent
Development, Copyright Protectionof Computer DatabasesAfter Feist, 5 HARv.J.L. & TECH.
215, 230 (1991) ("This leads to the troubling result that a more useful database is less
likely to be protected than its less useful counterpart."); Lipton, supra note 23, at
808-09 ("[T]he more commercially valuable the database is, the less likely it is to
achieve copyright protection."); Jeffrey C. Wolken, Note, Just the Facts, Ma'am: A Case
for Uniform FederalRegulation of Information Databasesin the New InformationAge, 48 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1263, 1276-79 (1998) (noting that Feist's selection and arrangement
requirements functionally prevent most databases from achieving meaningful copyright protection).
ON LEGAL PROTECTION FOR DATABASES
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campaign was energized by the European Union's 1996 passage of a
directive that instructed its member countries to establish a strong sui
generis database right-one that would apply to American databases
65
only if equivalent legislation were enacted in the United States.
The immediate result of the U.S. lobbying effort was a series of
three federal bills, none of which was enacted. 66 The bills varied
somewhat, but each conditioned its grant of rights on an investment
67
of substantial resources in the making of the compilation and provided a remedy against the unauthorized extraction of "all or a substantial part" of the data if the extraction harmed the compiler's
actual market or a potential or related market.68 These proposals essentially sought a broad sui generis entitlement that,69 like copyright,
would reach far into downstream derivative markets.
65 See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 o.J. (L 77) pmbl. 56 [hereinafter E. U. Database Directive]. For an analysis of the impact of the E.U. directive on
internationalization of database protection, see J.H. Reichman, DatabaseProtectionin a
GlobalEconomy, 2002 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE [R.I.D.E.] 455.
66 Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999); Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998); Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th Cong.
(1996). H.R. 3531 never made it out of committee; the last official action consisted of
introductory remarks on the House floor. 142 CONG. REC. 12,483-84 (1996). H.R.
2652 passed the House twice, once on its own, 144 CONG. REc. 9,681 (1998), and once
as Title V of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 144 CONG. REc. 18,783 (1998), but
it failed to reach the Senate floor. The HouseJudiciary Committee reported H.R. 354
to the full House, which took no action on it. 145 CONG. REc. 23,423 (1999). A
fourth bill, the Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, H.R. 1858,
106th Cong. (1999), was offered by opponents of the more expansive approach and
was accordingly narrower in scope; it made it out of the Commerce Committee to the
House floor, but advanced no further. 145 CONG. REc. 23,423 (1999).
67 The first bill required "a qualitatively or quantitatively substantial investment of
human, technical, financial or other resources in the collection, assembly, verification, organization or presentation of the database contents." H.R. 3531 § 3 (a); see also
E. U. DatabaseDirective, supra note 65, art. 7 (using similar language). The two subsequent bills made the entitlement contingent on the "investment of substantial monetary or other resources." H.R. 354 sec. 2, § 1402(a); H.R. 2652 § 1202.
68 H.R. 354 § 1402(a); H.R. 2652 § 1202; H.R. 3531 § 4(a)(1). The fourth bill,
which did not have widespread support within the database industry, merely gave the
Federal Trade Commission the power to prevent and punish a competitor's sale of a
duplicate database as an illegal trade practice. H.R. 1858 §§ 102, 107.
69 Two of the bills purported to use misappropriation or unfair competition principles, see H.R. 354, sec. 2; H.R. 2652, sec. 2, but the breadth of conduct that they
proposed to regulate made it look as if they were in fact pursuing a sui generis intellectual property right rather than a mere ban on unfair competition. H.R. REP. No.
106-349, at 11 (1999) (admitting that H.R. 354 offered protection "comparable" to a
sui generis right); Benkler, supra note 33, at 537-38 ("House Bill 354 ... creat[es] a
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In contrast, the more recent legislative offerings derive from "hot
news" and misappropriation models that are inherently narrower in
scope. 70 The misappropriation proposal would apply to any database
that results from a substantial expenditure of resources and would forbid unauthorized distribution of a quantitatively substantial part of
the database-but only when the distribution occurs "in a time sensitive manner," threatens the needed incentive to produce the
database, and displaces the developer's sources of revenue. 7 1 The
database industry has been surprisingly supportive of this approach,
given its comparatively limited coverage. 72 Probably less popular with
database developers is the "hot news" approach, which applies only to
property right in raw information in all but name .... ."); Ginsburg, supra note 23, at
171-76 (characterizing proposals as sui generis legislation). And these two bills were
to become part of title 17 of the U.S. Code, where the Copyright Act resides, which
suggests that they were establishing property rights and not an unfair competition
tort. In contrast, the first bill to be introduced, H.R. 3531, was to be placed in Title
15, where federal unfair competition statutes like 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) are codified.
For more on the significance of placing any new database legislation in Title 17, see
infra Part II.C.2 (discussing relevance to database debate of precise wording of
technolegical provisions of the DMCA).
70 See Consumer Access to Information Act of 2004, H.R. 3872, 108th Cong.
(2004) ("hot news" model); Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2003) (misappropriation model). Calling only one
of these bills a "hot news" model is perhaps a bit inaccurate, as both bills' liability
standards are clearly based on the "hot news" case of NationalBasketballAss' v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). National BasketballAss'n allowed a private right
of action under New York law where:
(i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii) the information
is time-sensitive; (iii) a defendant's use of the information constitutes free
riding on the plaintiff's efforts; (iv) the defendant is in direct competition
with a product or service offered by the plaintiffs; and (v) the ability of other
parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff or others would so reduce
the incentive to produce the product or service that its existence or quality
would be substantially threatened.
105 F.3d at 845. National BasketballAss'n in turn derives from InternationalNews Service
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), which recognized an unfair competition claim
based on a defendant's "taking material that has been acquired by complainant as the
result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which is
salable by complainant for money" and "appropriating it and selling it as its own." Id.
at 239. The important differences between the bills are that only H.R. 3261 provides
for a private right of action, and H.R. 3872 applies to a narrower range of data. Compare H.R. 3872 §§ 2, 4 with H.R. 3261 §§ 3, 7.
71 H.R. 3261 § 3.
72 See Database and Collections of Information Misappropriations,Joint Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intell. Prop., House Judiciary Comm., and the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot., House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
108th Cong. 21-22 (2003) (testimony of Keith Kupferschmid on behalf of Coalition
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"highly time-sensitive" data (and which in its latest incarnation would
be enforceable only by the Federal Trade Commission, rather than by
an aggrieved individual database developer itself) .73
These proposals have given rise to a great deal of scholarly comment on the merits and proper form of any legal entitlement that
implicates compilations of data. This scholarship questions the need
74
raises doubts
for any added incentive for database development,
about the constitutionality of a database entitlement under Feist and
the First Amendment, 75 and expresses concern about impeding access
Against Database Piracy), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hear
ings/09232003hearing1086/Kupferschmid1712.htm.
73 H.R. 3872 § 2(b) (2). Neither H.R. 3872 nor H.R. 3261 advanced beyond committee approval, a failure probably occasioned by their rivalry. Indeed, the House
Energy and Commerce Committee took the unusual step of unfavorably reporting
H.R. 3261 on the same day that it favorably reported H.R. 3872. See 150 CONG. REC.
D175 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2004). In contrast, the House Judiciary committee favorably
reported H.R. 3261, see 150 CONG. Rac. DlI (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2004), and did not
consider H.R. 3872 at all.
74 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 33, at 595-96 (questioning the empirical evidence
supporting a bill to provide protection to real-time market data providers); Benkler,
supra note 17, at 445 ("[T]here is little evidence to suggest that the database industry
is suffering, or that the proposed law will address such a problem without doing more
harm than good."); Litman, supra note 17, at 611-12 (noting that the database industry is "burgeoning, dynamic, and immensely profitable" even without clear legal protection); Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation:A Dirge, 40 Hous. L. REv. 621, 635-37
(2003) (reasoning that existing law provides adequate protection to database owners); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 123 (noting that the U.S. database
industry dominates the world market for databases); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note
25, at 408 (asserting that "there is no credible evidence that the market for databases
has been under-supplied or under-invested in the United States, even though the
share of U.S. commercial databases in the world market has declined somewhat in the
[
last ten years"); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 17, at 814 (stating that " p]ractically all
databases developed in the pursuit of basic research and education are motivated by
non-economic incentives such as the desire to create knowledge, the thrill of discovery, and the enhancement of professional status").
75 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 33, at 575-600 (concluding that the Intellectual
Property Clause limits Congress's power to create intellectual property rights);Jane C.
Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of InformationAfter Feist v.

Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 338, 367-87 (1992) (discussing Congress's constitutional authority to create protections for compiled information); Paul J. Heald,
The Extraction/DuplicationDichotomy: ConstitutionalLine-Drawing in the DatabaseDebate,

62 OHIO ST. L.J. 933, 944-45 (2001) (questioning the constitutionality of legislation
denying public use of facts in published works on an original meaning basis); Thomas
B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and ConstitutionalNorms, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 272, 280

(2004) (noting that "as a result of Feist, [databases] probably cannot be granted protection pursuant to the copyright power"); Pollack, supra note 17, at 61 (concluding
that Congress has authority to protect databases under the Commerce Clause only if
the act is limited to situations of market failure); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note
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to and use of data by downstream users, such as scientific researchers
and value-adding competitors. 76 But scholars have paid scant attention to the role of architecture in database regulation. When the
scholarship does mention the architectural, it often conflates it with
or subsumes it within the issue of legal entitlements. 7 7
17, at 144-45 (asserting that an unfair competition approach would be viable under
the First Amendment and Feist); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 17, at 833-36 (arguing
that facts that copyright law places in the public domain "cannot constitutionally be
withdrawn from public use under the First Amendment by a database law that protects against extraction and use on both primary and derivative markets"); see also
Memorandum from Jonathan Band, Morrison & Foerster LLP, to NetCoalition 12-17
(Jan. 15, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Band Memorandum] (discussing
H.R. 3261's constitutional infirmities).
76 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 33, at 569-74 (discussing the constitutional importance of "Progress" and the impact of altering the strength of intellectual property
rights thereupon); Pollack, supra note 17, at 115-20 (expressing concern that strong
database protections would impede scientific progress);J.H. Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself: Informal Remarks Concerning the Systemic Problems Afflicting Developed
Intellectual Property Regimes, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HuMAN GENOME
PROJECT 289, 297 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) ("The unresolved problem of how to avoid
a kudzu-like proliferation of strong exclusive rights controlling slivers of innovation
has recently given rise to a cancerous deviant regime that threatens to attack the integrity of the upstream commons through which all scientific and technical information had previously been filtered."); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 113-30
(arguing that sui generis rights for databases would retard scientific progress and
competition in value-added data services); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 25, at
396-410 (predicting that intellectual property in data collections would reduce the
level of sharing among researchers of data complied by governments and academic
institutions); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 17, at 799-821 (arguing that new sui

generis database rights would be damaging to science and education).
77 This happens most often with regard to the distinction between contractual
and technological constraints. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 17, at 429-35 (analyzing
the effectiveness and enforceability of "shrink-wrap" licenses); William W. Fisher III,
Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1231-40 (1998) (asserting that certain contractual or technological rearrangements of entitlements should
be permitted, but others should be proscribed); Lipton, supra note 23, at 802 (addressing contract and technology protection measures concurrently); Michael J.
Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 287-90 (2003)
(arguing that the DCMA's anti-circumvention provisions encourage licensing);
Netanel, supra note 34, at 382-85 (criticizing digital protections as promoting contractual limitations on the use of intellectual property to the detriment of the public);
see also Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights
Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137 passim (1997)
(using term "rights" to refer to architectural rather than legal constraints on behavior). But see Burk & Cohen, supra note 19, at 51-52 (distinguishing between code and
contractual constraints); Cohen, supra note 8, at 1115 (observing that a freedom of
contract argument against electronic regulation of performance "conflates digital
code with 'contract,' and calls the result a purely private form of ordering exempt
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The database debate, however, will not be settled by (or only by)
the enactment vel non of a new intellectual property entitlement. Indeed, traditional legal modalities may well be a sideshow. Rather, a
primary constraint on the use of databases will be architectural. Digital architecture exacerbates the public goods problem, but it is also an
instrument of enclosure. Technology can now do as much as or more
than the law to regulate the market for databases. 78 The participants
in the database debate-and particularly those opposed to the expansion of intellectual property rights-thus need to focus on and take
advantage of the law's potential to shape architecture. They need to
get technolegical.
To understand why architecture can and should play a vital role
in database regulation, and how the law can further this role, one
must first explicitly recognize what was implicit in the foregoing discussion of technology's effect on information goods: the characteristics of a public good (nonexcludability and nonrivalrousness) are-at
least in the first instance-architectural, a function of the state of
technology. 79 The existence of a significant public goods problem
varies with the excludability and rivalrousness of the information medium, an architectural determinant. Intellectual property law's regulation of information is a response to a market failure that arises only
when certain architectural conditions obtain. In other words, the
public goods problem depends on the extent to which information
can be and has been de-reified. The solution, whether it favors
stronger property rights or not, will have to partake of the technological as well, because architectural modalities govern access to and use
of databases at least as much as traditional intellectual property
entitlements.
from public policy limits-although 'contract' is not and never has been exempt from
such limits"); Lessig, Law of the Horse, supra note 1, at 528-30 (distinguishing between
code and contractual constraints).
78 The potential for architectural modalities (in the form of computer code) to
supplant or obviate the law was first articulated in Lawrence Lessig's The Law of the
Horse, supra note 1, at 507-08, and Joel Reidenberg's Lex Informatica, supra note 1, at
554-55.
79 Intellectual property law also affects excludability; indeed, that is its purpose.
See Benkler, supra note 33, at 543 n.23 (explaining that excludability spurs private
production of nonrivalrous goods such as intellectual property, which have an optimal demand price of zero and would therefore otherwise not be produced). But at
the outset, excludability is determined by the architecture of the information medium
alone. Id.; see also Fox, supra note 52, at 11 ("[I]nformation's relative exclusivity depends upon the nature of the selected medium responsible for its communication,
because that actually determines the cost of access to the information.").
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If architecture is to play a key role in resolving the database debate, however, we must first know what role architecture currently
plays in the database market. This is the focus of the following three
sections. First, I show how database developers can impose (and have
imposed) architectural constraints on access to and use of their products, constraints that have the potential to render irrelevant the debate over the merits and proper form of a legal entitlement for
databases. Next, I discuss existing and proposed technolegical measures that directly and indirectly buttress these architectural constraints. Finally, I rebut the argument that the enhanced control that
these architectural constraints provide to database developers will result in welfare-enhancing price discrimination.
B.

Obviating the Legal

As discussed in Part I, digital technology has exacerbated the public goods problem for databases. At the same time, however, digital
technology has created opportunities for an unprecedented level of
architectural control on the part of developers of databases and other
information goods.80 This control depends not on the enactment of
an intellectual property entitlement, or indeed on any public ordering of rights, but rather only on the ever-expanding capabilities and
ever-diminishing limits of digital technology. It is a truly private ordering of behavioral constraints.
Developers can use technological means to prevent or limit access and use of their digitized products in a number of ways, thereby
solving the public goods problem without recourse to legal modalities.
A detailed, technical review of these measures is unnecessary here,
both because they have been discussed in detail elsewhere 8 ' and because the pace of technological progress would quickly render obso80 "Thus, with regard to databases, digital technology challenges existing legal
structures in two opposing ways. Digital technologies aggravate market failure in
some cases, because they facilitate piracy. In other cases, they endow the originator
with abnormal market power." Paula Baron, Back to the Future:Learningfrom the Past in
the Database Debate, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 879, 893 (2001); see also Cohen, supra note 8, at

1093 ("The same technologies that can be used to propagate information can also
build fences around it.").
81
See, e.g., Brian W. Esler, Protectingthe Protection:A Trans-Atlantic Analysis of the
Emerging Right to Technological Self-Help, 43 IDEA 553, 555-561 (2003) (providing an

overview of existing technological protection measures); Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BuEY. L. REV.

845, 876-94 (1997) (outlining technological measures available to prevent profit erosion for copyright holders); Stefik, supra note 77, at 139-44 (suggesting a system of
specific technologies to enable secure digital publishing); Symposium, The Law &
Technology of Digital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 487 (2003).
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lete any such review. For present purposes, the following examples
will suffice.
Suppose the developer of a digital database decides that releasing
the database on a freestanding medium makes it too susceptible to
unauthorized access, use, or copying. The developer consequently
chooses to de-reify the data completely by making it available only
over an online network, such as the Internet. Those who wish to use
the database then have to access it through a software program chosen and adapted by the developer to bar unauthorized persons from
using the database. The software could impose restrictions even on
authorized users, such as preventing them from accessing all the data
at once, keeping them from copying data to their own computers
without prior permission (i.e., without paying a fee), and monitoring
what data they use and how long they use them. This example is
hardly hypothetical; the popular legal and news databases offered by
Lexis and Westlaw use such a model. It is the digital equivalent of a
print publisher's requiring customers to use its white pages only
under the publisher's watchful eye, where unauthorized uses can be
quickly curtailed. The difference is that marketing a digital database
under such conditions can be cost-efficient, using the same technology that exacerbated the public goods problem to solve the
problem.

8 2

If online-only access is infeasible for marketing or other reasons,
then the database could be released on a freestanding medium like
CD or DVD, but subject to copy protection measures embedded in the
software. The purchaser of the database might be technologically
barred from making a comprehensive copy of the data, or copying
them more than a few times, or even accessing all of them at oncewhatever restrictions the developer fancies. (As Lawrence Lessig has
observed, this is the digital equivalent of a bookseller who attached a
82 This is not to say that using architectural means to increase the cost of copying
digital information goods is itself a cost-free proposition. Monitoring of online
database users, like copy protection software and similar technological controls, imposes costs, as does restricting customers' means of access and permitted uses. Yet
leaving digital databases technologically unprotected would impose costs as well. An
architecturally unfettered database is vulnerable to an infinite amount of unauthorized copying, use, and dissemination; the cost of releasing the database without technological controls is therefore likely to be much higher than the cost of imposing
technological controls that eliminate or severely reduce those threats. In the end, this
is an empirical question that is impossible to answer as a practical matter, but the
commercial viability of architecturally controlled databases like those offered by Lexis
and Westlaw shows that in at least those contexts the costs are not too high. There is
no reason to believe the costs would be prohibitive for other database developers
either.
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police officer to each book sold, "so that the officer followed you
83
around and made sure that you used the book as you promised.")
Encryption of the database contents could provide another means of
access control.8 4 In short, digital developers have at their disposal any
number of extralegal means of making their products excludable.
Digital architecture can thus allow database developers to bypass
the law entirely and engage instead in a purely private ordering of
behavioral constraints, without any concern for the balance that we
find (or at least aspire to) in the carefully designed structure of intellectual property law. Developers concerned with private gain and not
public benefit would render ineffective the mechanisms that the law
traditionally uses to strike that balance.8 5 Take copyright law, the closest existing analog to the proposals for database protection. Copyright law is full of safeguards against the threat of excessive private
market power that comes with its grant of exclusive rights.8 6 Copy83

Lessig, Law of the Horse, supra note 1, at 525.
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 64, at 26 (reporting that "some
[database] companies believe that encryption is an option whose time is just around
the corner"); Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2000) ("Encryption technology makes it
possible, at least in principle, for owners of information goods perfectly to control
access to, and use of, their products."). Certain restrictions on the export of encryption technology might, however, limit the use of encryption as content control for
transnational products. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288,
1310-11 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (concluding that export controls and compulsory licensing
for encryption and decryption software violate the First Amendment on grounds of
prior restraint), affd, 176 F.3d 1132, withdrawn and reh'g granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th
Cir. 1999); Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, No. 96-5121, 1997 WL 71750, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 21, 1997) (noting that the Department of Commerce has regulatory authority
over non-military cryptographic computer source code).
85 Of course, we have known since the time of Adam Smith that we can advance
social welfare by promoting the pursuit of private gain through the use of perpetual,
alienable, and exclusive property rights. But the nonrival nature of information
means that we run the risk of deadweight loss if we blindly follow this model for
information goods. See Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionalityof the Copyright
Term Extension Act, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 123, 125-26 (2002) (discussing the importance of the "limited periods" constitutional directive for patents and copyrights).
There are also other reasons not to adopt a pure free-market model for databases. See
infra notes 162-73 and accompanying text.
86
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited
nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be
achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired.
84
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right's entitlements exist only so long as necessary to provide the
8 7
needed incentive to create and disseminate a copyrighted work.
Even while the rights last, certain aspects of the work pass into the
public domain.8 8 And those aspects of the work that remain protected are nonetheless subject to certain privileged uses that do not
result in liability.8 9
Database developers, like other producers of information goods,
can and will use technology to override the public interests that inform these safeguards. A developer concerned with maximizing profits will not forgo architectural protections simply because it already
90
has a sufficient incentive to create the database. Neither will it limit
the duration of its architecturally secured "rights"-e.g., by removing
existing copy protection measures-once enough time has passed for
it to recoup its investment in compilation. Nor will a developer willingly share its database in architecturally unfettered form with researchers or other putative fair users without some expectation of
profit. 9' Architecture overrides law.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
87 Whether the length of the current copyright term is excessive in light of this
incentivizing goal is a matter of some debate. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, The Term of
Copyright, in GROWING PAINS: ADAPTING COPYRIGHT FOR EDUCATION AND SOCIETY 33,
36-39 (Laura N. Gasaway ed., 1997) (arguing that extending the copyright term is
unwise); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242-43 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (challenging the economic argument for extension of the copyright term for
existing works); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 471, 473 (2003) (proposing a copyright term indefinite in
length but subject to periodic renewals as a means of achieving the incentivizing
goal).
88 "Some aspects of copyrighted works are thought to be so important to the public that society demands unrestricted access to them immediately, without waiting for
the copyright to expire. Ideas and works of the federal government are said to possess
these qualities." Litman, supra note 46, at 1013; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000)
("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery .... ."); id. § 105 ("Copyright protection under this title is not available for any
work of the United States Government .... ").
89 17 U.S.C. § 107 (setting forth the fair use defense).
90 Lipton, supra note 23, at 787 ("Strengthened by these laws [that support technological and contractual protections of electronically stored information], market
players that tend to have their own commercial interests at heart are unlikely to spend
time and resources to implement systems to protect competing interests.").
91 See Samuelson, supra note 53, at 161 ("Under existing law, technical measures
do not need to be designed to enable privileged uses, and few thus far deployed do
so."). In the classic terminology of Hohfeld, fair use is a mere "privilege," not a
"right," and therefore imposes no Hohfeldian "duty" on information producers to
refrain from architecturally interfering with fair use opportunities. See Wesley New-
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Of course, whenever someone builds a better mousetrap, the
mice get smarter. Architectural measures of any kind are vulnerable
to counteracting architectural measures. In this case, hackers-i.e.,
those with the technological sophistication to circumvent a developer's protective efforts-could potentially evade the architectural restrictions and thus destroy the attendant excludability. 92 Indeed, the
conventional wisdom is that hackers will inevitably overcome any technological protection implemented by information producers. 9 3 This
conventional wisdom, however, should be of little comfort to those
concerned about the information industry's efforts to exert effective
architectural control over its products, for three reasons.
First, developers do not have to eliminate the threat of hacking
entirely. They merely have to reduce it to a level that allows them to
recoup the costs of their architectural measures and secure the incentive to compile the data in the first place. 9 4 As long as it is cost-effeccomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16, 30-33 (1913) (defining rights, duties, and privileges). Fair use thus only
comes into play as a defense, after the fair user has engaged in some unauthorized
use of a copyrighted work. It has no role to play if architectural restrictions have
denied the putative fair user any chance to engage in such use in the first place. See
id. at 35 (observing that even if X has a privilege to eat a salad A may still "hold[ ]
fast to the dish").
92 See Posner, supra note 74, at 635-36 (noting the "arms-race" nature of any
database regime that relies on technological protections). Compare, e.g., Alex Veiga,
New Copy-Protected CDs to Hit U.S. Stores, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at A3 (describing MediaMax copy-protection technology for music CDs), with Kevin Coughlin, CD
Technology Isn't so Protected, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 8, 2003, at 4 (describing
how a college student defeated MediaMax technology merely by holding down the
Shift key as a CD was inserted into the computer).
93 "Any electronic on-line system is vulnerable to attack. That is close to an axiom
in the field of computer security. So too, therefore, are self-help systems vulnerable."
Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the, DigitalJungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 401 (1999)
(footnotes omitted); see also David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and
Common Law, 72 Miss. L.J. 143, 200-01 (2002) (noting that "each new level of security
seems inevitably to be defeated by a loose, worldwide network of computer-savvy adolescents"); Mary M. Calkins, Note, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don't They? An Economic
Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory Models, 89 GEO. L.J. 171, 198 (2000) ("No security
system is perfect and hackers will eventually find a way around even the best security."); Michael Lee et al., Comment, Electronic Commerce, Hackers, and the Searchfor Legitimacy: A Regulatory Proposal, 14 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 839, 864 (1999) ("History and
experience have shown that no system can be made perfectly secure. 'Secured systems' employing code-based solutions will always remain vulnerable to unexpected
attacks exploiting overlooked flaws in design, implementation, or operation.").
94 For example, the film industry has managed to reduce to a tolerable level the
copying of movies released on DVD by using a combination of software and hardware
controls called ACP to cause "VCRs to make distorted copies, devoid of entertainment
value." MACROVISON CORP., PRESERVING AN EFFECTIVE DVD CoFy PROTECTION SYSTEM
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tive to stay one step ahead of the hackers, developers will not mind
occasionally being outdueled. And at least in some instances concentrated industry resources will triumph over disparate and diffuse
technophiles.
Second, social norms may assist database developers in keeping
hacking down to an acceptable level. Unlike the established music
industry, the nascent database industry does not have to fight deeply
rooted and widespread expectations about freedom of access to (and
use of) its products.9 5 And a number of statutes that outlaw hacking-i.e., technolegical laws that favor producers of information
place to reinforce these social norms and act as
goods-are already in 96
a further disincentive.
Third, and most important, hacking only helps those with the
means and inclination to hack. Most of the public lacks one or the
other, or both. Developers' architectural protections are therefore
likely to be effective against all but a small segment of the mass market.9 7 Perhaps some hackers will become information Samaritans, giv(2003),

available at http://www.macrovision.com/pdfs/Preserving-an-effective-DVD-

Copying-System_0303.pdf; see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d 294, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the Content Scramble System technology used to prevent digital duplication of DVD content);Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in
Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management,"97 MICH. L. REv. 462,
526 (1998) (noting that despite the existence of devices for circumventing videotapes'
copy-protection measures, "there is no evidence suggesting that substantial numbers
of ordinary consumers use them"); May Wong, DVD Copy Control Group Sues Maker of
Copying Programs, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 2004, § 5, at 2 (describing series of suits by
Macrovision and the film industry against "321 Studios Inc., the maker of popular
DVD-copying programs").
95 As noted supra note 25, there is a subset of the database industry that has normative expectations. And one might argue that Feist has given rise to social norms
regarding access to and use of databases. But Feist was decided only a dozen years
ago, and the two hundred years of U.S. copyright law that preceded it were actually
quite friendly to claims of proprietary rights in factual compilations. See Ginsburg,
supra note 40, at 1873-93 (discussing the history of copyright law). It is therefore
unlikely that the person on the street has preexisting expectations regarding his or
her access to and use of databases.
96 See infra Part II.C.
97 Note thatJulie Cohen's famous "right to hack"-the right to circumvent architectural constraints on access to information when they inhibit the exercise of a legal
entitlement-is not a technolegical measure. See Cohen, supra note 8, at 1141 (discussing a "right of fair breach"); see also Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1, 59 (1995) (arguing that fair use "should
be used to privilege otherwise infringing acts that give the public and competitors the
kind of access [to technologically restricted works] that normally exists for mass-market and other commercialized copyrighted works"). Both Cohen's right to hack and
Kreiss's expanded fair use defense relieve hackers of liability ifthe hacking succeeds,
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ing the rest of us access to protected material.9 8 But this possibility
hardly allows those who fear the market power of technologically enclosed products to rest easy, as the technologically inept would have
no assurance that the choices a hacker would make about which products to liberate and distribute would coincide with their own
preferences. 99
In any event, even if hackers do routinely defeat developers and
share their booty with the rest of us, we are still left with an arms race
whose outcome bears no necessary relation to intellectual property's
goals. A Wild West in which hackers triumph is still a Wild West.
Some hackers may hack only to obtain data to which they have a legal
right, such as fair use, but others will undoubtedly hack simply to get
for free data that a sensible information policy would require them to
pay for. And while the latter form of hacking might expose its perpetrators to infringement liability, the transaction costs inherent in suing and recovering damages from such a scattered universe of
infringers are likely to render toothless any legal entitlement. Allowing hackers to copy and disseminate whatever information products they see fit is therefore little better than allowing information
producers to engage in unregulated architectural enclosure of their
goods. Although information producers tend to have legal entitlements on their side, in both instances architecture plays the greater
role in controlling the outcome.
This notion that technology threatens to displace law as the primary constraint on behavior in the digital world is not new. Lawrence
Lessig provided the best articulation of this danger in his 1999 essay
but they do not return us to a world of reified "mass-market and other commercialized copyrighted works" unless we are all hackers and are all guaranteed success in
our hacking. See Nimmer, supra note 18, at 739-40 ("If the courts apply section 1201
[of the DMCA] as written, the only users whose interests are truly safeguarded are
those few who personally possess sufficient expertise to counteract whatever technological measures are placed in their path."). Cohen and Kreiss thus offer defensive
means of counteracting pro-expansionist technolegical measures, but they do not propose affirmative anti-expansionist technolegical measures. See also Thomas Heide,
Copyright, Contract and the Legal Protection of Technological Measures-Not "The Old Fashioned Way ": Providing a Rationale to the "Copyright Exceptions Interface, "50 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'v U.S.A. 315, 334-38 (2003) (suggesting a model that allows circumvention of
pro-expansionist technological protections but does not necessarily make such circumvention possible).
98 The term "information Samaritan" appears to have been coined by G.M. Hunsucker in his article The EuropeanDatabaseDirective:Regional Stepping Stone to an International Model?, 7 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 697, 702 & n.5 (1997).
99 See Burk & Cohen, supra note 19, at 82 ("Even the most user-friendly circumvention technologies will require some threshold level of technological
competence.").

2004 ]

RE-REIFYING

DATA

The Law of the Horse,' 0 and several commentators have observed this
potential in the database industry as well. 10 1 Yet too often the discussion of legal modalities subsumes the discussion of architectural/technological modalities, even though the former are a form of public
ordering and the latter represent purely private ordering. This is particularly true when commentators examine the uses of contract law in
information transactions. 10 2 Contractual agreements resemble architectural measures in that individuals may use both to render excludable otherwise nonexcludable goods, and neither method requires a
preexisting, statutory legal entitlement in the information.10 3 Because
contracts ultimately depend on an exercise of state power for their
enforcement, however, they are subject to policies designed to promote the public interest in a way that architectural measures are
not.' 0 4 To be sure, "private" contracts can challenge the balance that
intellectual property law strikes in the same way that technological
100 "And to the extent that architectures of law are balanced between private and
public values, we should worry if architectures of code become imbalanced. We
should worry, that is, if they respect private values but displace public values." Lessig,
Law of the Horse, supra note 1, at 529. Lessig expanded on this notion in CoDE, supra
note 1; see also Reidenberg, supra note 1; Mark Gimbel, Note, Some Thoughts on the
Implications of Trusted Systems for Intellectual Property Law, 50 STAN. L. Rv. 1671, 1672
(1998) ("The danger is not that copyright law will be infringed but that it will be
supplanted-replaced by technological mechanisms of protection that strike a far less
benevolent balance between the rights of the property owner and the good of the
public."). But see Wagner, supra note 5, at 1015-16 (arguing that digital technology
provides less architectural control over information goods than scholars have
presumed).
101 See, e.g., Baron, supra note 80, at 893 (arguing that digital technologies may
facilitate piracy or produce "abnormal market power"); Litman, supra note 17, at
611-12 (noting that a lack of meaningful intellectual property protection would limit
public access to information); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 153 (discussing the effects of a database owner's monopoly on scientific users).
102 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
103 As we will see infra Part II.D, contractual measures and technological measures
also both allow producers of information goods to engage in price discrimination,
which in theory can solve the deadweight loss problem.
104 Cohen, supra note 8, at 1115; Lessig, Law of the Horse, supra note 1, at 528-30.
The use of contracts to achieve optimal protection for databases and other information goods is beyond the scope of this article, and in any event has been discussed at
length elsewhere. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 17, at 429-40 (information goods in
general); Fisher, supra note 77, at 1204-12 (same); Ginsburg, supra note 23, at
164-71 (databases); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawingthe Boundary Between Copyright and
Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DuKE LJ. 479, 479-82 (1995)
(software); J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contractwith Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA.
L. REv. 875, 876-84 (1999) (information goods in general); Reichman & Uhlir, supra
note 25 (databases).
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controls can. But restoring that balance for the former implicates the
familiar issue of preemption, whereas restoring the balance for the
latter leads us into the new and unfamiliar territory of anti-expansionist technolegical regulation. 0 5 More fundamentally, contract law presupposes a certain level of architectural control on the part of the
database developer: the only reason anyone would agree to restrictive
contractual terms is because he or she lacks any less costly means to
obtain access to the product.
In short, architectural protections threaten to allow database developers to control access to and use of their products with no regard
for whether this control serves the public interest. Developers would
in effect unilaterally decide the issues raised in the database debate.
They would put and keep the protections in place regardless of the
need for a compilation incentive. They would encounter no constitutional impediment, because their actions would be completely private.
And they would enable downstream and other fair uses, if at all, only
as a voluntary (and thus desultory) act of largesse. Hacking would
provide an insufficient safeguard, and the solution to the parallel
problem of contractual restrictions-preemption-would be inapplicable in the database context. Unfortunately, as we shall now see, the
technolegical measures that already exist or are under consideration
enhance, rather than cabin, developers' power to constrain users
architecturally.
C.

Technolegical Measures for the Pro-Expansionists

Those concerned about the expansion of intellectual property
rights and the enclosure of the public domain have been playing defense in the battle over technolegical measures. They protest the enactment of laws that add legal backing to architectural methods of
control, but with few exceptions offer little in the way of affirmative
technolegical measures of their own to counteract the dangers posed
by expansive technological protections. Nor have the anti-expansionists played defense very effectively, either in the battle over information goods in general or in the database debate in particular. As a
result, the technolegical measures that already exist or have been proposed exacerbate rather than mitigate the problem of excessive architectural control over databases.
105 Another reason to be vigilant about conflating contract and technology is that
contractual means of control face obstacles that technology does not, especially when
one considers that contract is a matter of state law and thus can suffer from lack of
uniformity. See supra note 12 (discussing the checkered history of UCITA).
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Existing Technolegical Measures

Although anti-expansionists are very attentive and fervent in their
opposition to technolegical measures in copyright law, they have almost completely failed to consider the relationship between existing
technolegical measures and database protection. Yet two well-known
federal statutes already regulate circumvention of certain technologies that protect databases. In the absence of a database enactment
that includes an anti-expansionist technolegical component, then,
database developers already have legal as well as architectural
advantages.
The first statute is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) ,106
which is the federal government's main anti-hacking statute. When
Congress enacted the CFAA in 1984,107 it targeted for criminal prosecution only those hackers who were after classified government information or financial records, or who tried to impede use of a
government computer. 10 8 The Act was later amended, however, to
cover trafficking in computer passwords and the alteration of information in virtually any computer over which Congress could exert Commerce Clause jurisdiction.10 9 Congress later added a civil remedy as
well, authorizing private parties to secure injunctions and compensa11 0
tion for violations of the statute that cause more than $5000 in loss.
Insofar as the CFAA directly regulates attempts to circumvent
technological access protections, it is a technolegical measure. In
other words, its provisions give private parties, such as database developers, a legal means of strengthening the architectural fences that enclose their products. The Act does require that a private party suffer
$5000 in losses before it can bring a private right of action, but the
losses from even a seemingly harmless hacking can add up quickly
when they include "any reasonable cost to any victim, including the
cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment,
and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other
106

18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).

107

Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L.

No. 98-473, §§ 2102-2103, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190-92 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A. § 1030).
108 Dodd S. Griffith, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured
Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REv. 453, 460-61 (1990).
4
109 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2(d), (g)( ),
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
100 Stat. 1213, 1213-15 (1984)
§ 1030(a)(4)-(6), (e)(2)).
110 Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 290001, 108
Stat. 1796, 2097-99 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030).
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consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service." 1 ' Add to this the market value of whatever data were taken (if
that value can be assessed) and the $5000 threshold can be easily surpassed. At least two scholars have accordingly pointed out that the
CFAA could impede online information gathering,1 1 2 and two cases
have applied the Act to the use of Internet data-mining programs." 3
There is every reason to believe that a database developer concerned
with losing control over its database would take advantage of the
CFAA.
The second existing statute that gives legal backing to database
developers' efforts to protect their products through extralegal means
is the DMCA, specifically Titles I and I1.114 The DMCA has a number
of technolegical aspects, including provisions that outlaw the removal
or falsification of copyright management information"5 and that encourage online service providers to adopt technological measures designed to protect copyrighted material against unauthorized use.' 1 6
Its most controversial technolegical provision, however, imposes civil
and criminal liability on those who circumvent "technological measures" designed to control access to a copyrighted work. 117 The Act
111 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(11) (West Supp. 2004).
112 Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud
and
Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L.
REv. 320,
324 (2004) (criticizing use of the CFAA to establish de facto rights in information
available to public); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Common Law and Statutory Restrictions
on
Access: Contract, Trespass, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 2002 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH.
& POL'y 295, 307-10 (noting that the CFAA can provide protection against
mere data
gathering); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who
Owns Product and PricingInformation?, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1965, 1991-92 (2000) (same).
Depending on the nature of the information obtained and whether it was stored or
in transit
when obtained, hackers might also run afoul of the Wiretap Act,
18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (2000), or the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710
(2000).
113 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 584-85 (1st
Cir. 2001)
(including within the "loss" fees paid to consultants to assess the effect of
unauthorized access); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 251-53
(S.D.N.Y.
2000) (including within the "loss" slight diminishment of server capacity and
response
time); see also Complaint at 17-18, Computer Info. Network, Inc. v. ESPN,
Inc.
(S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2004) (No. 04-CV-3707) (claiming that unauthorized access
to realtime sports statistics database violated CFAA), available at http://pub.bna.com/eclr/
04cv3707.pdf.
114 Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 101-105,
201-203,
112 Stat. 2860, 2861-86 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
115 17 U.S.C.A. § 1202 (West Supp. 2004).
116 Id. § 512(i).
117 Id. § 1201(a) (creating substantive provision); id. § 1203 (providing
for civil
liability), id. § 1204 (providing for criminal liability).
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does not define "technological measure," but one can glean the
breadth of the term from the definition of "circumvent," which includes descrambling, decryption, and other acts that "avoid, bypass,
remove, deactivate, or impair" architectural means by which informa1 18
tion producers seek to exert control over access to their goods.
These anti-circumvention provisions have garnered a tremendous
amount of criticism, mostly due to their failure to make an exception
for unauthorized access that does not lead to copyright infringement." 9 Bypassing the technological restrictions on access to a copyrighted work constitutes a DMCA violation even if the subsequent
unauthorized use of the work does not infringe copyright. 120 The stat12 1
ute focuses on the work, not the use.
The absence of a DMCA exception for non-infringing access circumvention has important consequences for the database debate. As
we have already seen, databases can earn copyright protection when
22
their selection and arrangement of data are sufficiently creative.'
118 Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
JEssIcA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 131-45 (2001) (noting alarm and
119 See, e.g.,
concern over expanded liability, exemptions, and other modifications of the DMCA
prior to enactment); Benkler, supra note 17, at 414-29 (discussing the DMCA's anticircumvention provision in the context of restricting free speech); Michael Landau,
Has the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Really Created a New Exclusive Right of Access?:
Attempting to Reach a Balance Between Users'and Content Providers'Rights,49J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 277, 282-86 (2001) (discussing the right of the public to have access to
and use a copyrighted work); Lunney, supra note 18, at 830-44 (discussing the effects
of the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions on the public interest); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations
Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 534-37 (1999) (arguing that the anticircumvention provisions are overbroad and threaten fair use and the public
domain).
120 See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943,
969 (E.D. Ky. 2003) ("The DMCA is clear that the right to protect against unauthorized access is a right separate and distinct from the right to protect against violations
of exclusive copyright rights such as reproduction and distribution."). Congress has
recently considered amending § 1201 to impose liability only when copyright infringement results from the circumvention. Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of
2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong. § 5 (2003).
121 In contrast, circumvention of an architectural measure that does not control
access-such as copy protection software-is not a DMCA violation. However, it is a
violation to make or sell certain devices or services that can be used to circumvent
copy protection software or other technologies that protect copyright. 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (b). And because one could presumably use such devices and services to access
wholly uncopyrightable information goods, the DMCA effectively inhibits perfectly
legal conduct in the database sphere as well. (I am indebted to Julie Cohen for this
observation.)
122 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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While the most valuable and flexible databases are the least likely to
meet this standard, 2 3 there will always be some databases that do
qualify. The DMCA covers such databases; it thus puts its considerable legal weight behind database developers' efforts to architecturally
restrict access. The hypothetical circumventer may be trying to access
and use the data only, rather than appropriate the copyrighted selection and arrangement, but the DMCA considers this distinction irrelevant. Civil and criminal liability attach as long as the database as a
whole is copyrighted and the circumvention is unauthorized.
The DMCA might not be as great a concern in the database debate if it covered only those few databases whose data are creatively
selected and arranged. But a database product can qualify for copyright protection in other ways as well. For example, digital databases
cannot function without search and retrieval software. Software is
protected by copyright.1 24 If the database developer uses one set of
technological access controls to protect both the software and the
data, then any circumvention of those controls is a DMCA violation,
even if the circumventer is interested in the uncopyrightable data and
not the copyrighted software. 12 5 Indeed, given copyright law's easily
satisfied threshold requirements,126 the clever database developer will
purposely make the tail wag the dog: write a short but copyrightable
poem, stick it behind the same access protections as the database, and
rest assured that the copyright in the poem will engage the DMCA
machinery for the database.

123 See supra Part I.C.2.
124 In fact, a student note written shortly after the Feist decision argues that competing databases are distinguished more by copyrightable search and retrieval
software than by uncopyrightable data content, and therefore that even without copyright protection developers are "already in a position to protect what is becoming the
most distinctive feature of their database systems." Philip H. Miller, Note, Life After
Feist: Facts, the FirstAmendment, and the Copyright Status of Automated Databases,60 FORDHAM L. REV. 507, 524 (1991).
125 Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 1635 (observing that technological control measures in conjunction with the DMCA "might enable the copyright owner to leverage a
'thin' copyright in informational works to protect public domain information").
126 "To be sure, the requisite level of creativity [for copyright protection] is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the
grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, 'no matter how crude, humble
or obvious' it might be." Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991) (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C] [1]

(1990)).
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Proposed Technolegical Measures

The CFAA and DMCA therefore reinforce legally what database
developers are already capable of achieving architecturally. Neither
statute, however, is a perfect fit. The CFAA has the $5000 loss requirement, and in any event only protects access to computers, which is of
little help to developers who release their products in freestanding
media rather than in an online client-server format. 127 Developers
can easily co-opt the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions, but
courts might understandably view such bootstrapping with
skepticism. 128
Database developers are therefore likely to seek enactment of
pro-expansionist technolegical measures that directly regulate
databases. Indeed, the first database protection bill that surfaced in
Congress, the Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996,129 included two such provisions. The first proposed outlawing devices and services whose primary purpose was the
evasion of architectural measures that inhibited infringement of the
right that the Act established. 13 0 The second would have outlawed the
removal or falsification of database management information. 13 1 Although the bill never made it out of committee, 1 32 copyright analogs
of each technolegical provision cropped up in the subsequently en33
acted DMCA. 1
127 There is, however, an argument-as yet untested-that even a freestanding
data storage medium like a CD or DVD falls within the Act's definition of "computer,"
which covers "an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed
data processingdevice performinglogical, arithmetic, or storagefunctions, and includes any

data storagefacility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (1) (2000) (emphasis added).
128 Dan Burk has suggested a framework for evaluating suspect attempts to leverage the DMCA's technolegical provisions. See Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse,
50 UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1132-40 (2003).
129 H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996).
130 Id. § 10.
131 Id. § 11.
132

See supra note 66.

133 The DMCA's version of the devices/services restriction is found in 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 1201(b) (West 1996 & Supp. 2004), and its protection of copyright management
information is found in 17 U.S.C.A. § 1202. One of the DMCA's other controversial
(but non-technolegical) provisions gave copyright owners the power to obtain subpoenas compelling an online service provider to identify alleged infringers that use its
service, without having to file suit. Id. § 512(h); see also In re Verizon Internet Servs.,
Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 248-68 (D.D.C. 2003) (enforcing a § 512(h) subpoena).
The discussion draft that formed the basis for one of Congress's two most recent
database protection proposals included a similar provision, but it was deleted from
the version of the legislation that was formally introduced in the House. Compare

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 8o:1I

In the two subsequent bills that the database industry supported-both of which came closer to enactment-the original bill's
explicit technolegical measures were absent.' 3 4 Their absence, however, was illusory, because the new bills' proposed placement in Title
17 of the U.S. Code13 5 would have afforded the new database rights
full technolegical protection under the DMCA's anti-circumvention
provisions, which apply notjust to copyrighted works but to any "work
protected under this title." 13 6 That is to say, any new database entitlement codified within Title 17 will automatically receive the DMCA's
protections, without the need for any creative selection and arrangement, search software, or cleverly placed poetry. 3 7y Indeed, the
DMCA would actually give databases more anti-circumvention protection than copyrighted works, because-unlike the grant of protection-most statutory exceptions to that protection pertain only to
138
copyrighted works.
D. PriceDiscrimination
Given the CFAA's and DMCA's existing technolegical provisions,
database developers already have legal backing for their architectural
protections. The likelihood that a new database enactment would
contain technolegical provisions tailored to the new entitlement or
Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. _,
108th
Cong. § 7(h) (2003) (draft) (on file with author) (containing subpoena provision)
with Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th
Cong. § 7 (2003) (omitting subpoena provision).
134 See Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999);
Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998). The
House approved H.R. 2652 twice, but the bill never saw a vote in the Senate. H.R. 354
succeeded in reaching the House floor, but went no further. See supra note 66.
135 The first line of each bill read: "To amend title 17, United States Code .
H.R. 354 pmbl.; H.R. 2652 pmbl.
136 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a) (1) (A). In fact, the second time that H.R. 2652 passed
the House was as part of the DMCA. (The first time was as freestanding legislation.)
See supra note 66. Note that Title 17 is also home to other sui generis intellectual
property regimes, such as those covering semiconductor chip design, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 901-914 (2000), live musical performances, id. § 1101, and vessel hulls, 17
U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1332 (West 1996 & Supp. 2004). Their intellectual property entitlements therefore also fall within the reach of the DMCA's anti-circumvention
protection.
137
Cf Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 147
(1998) (analyzing "under this title" language from 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)).
138
Compare 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (a) (1) (A) (applying anti-circumvention protection
to any "work protected under this title"), with id. § 1201 (a) (1) (B)-(D) (making exceptions to that protection for certain "copyrighted" works), and id. § 1201(d)

(same).
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would be codified in Title 17 simply adds to the already formidable
potential for developers to control and monitor every access and use
of their products. Not all aspects of this control, however, are negative. For example, technology is transnational; in contrast, a legislative enactment on database rights would extend only to the
jurisdiction's borders, and international protocols govern only those
nations that adopt them. Architectural control measures also allow
database developers to tailor their products to their customers' needs
and desires in ways that would otherwise be prohibitively expensive.
Given these advantages, one response to the perceived database
problem is to argue that no response is needed at all-i.e., that it is
not a problem. If consumers dislike architectural restrictions on
databases, the argument goes, then the invisible hand of the free market will push database developers to offer products without such restrictions. This argument would be appealing in a competitive market
for rival goods, but for several reasons it is less convincing when applied to nonrival information products such as databases. First, access
to databases, like access to other information products, produces positive externalities that individual consumer transactions do not take
into account.139 For example, the widespread availability of facts allows citizens to engage in robust, informed political debate, the collective value of which is not necessarily captured by whatever price the
140
citizens would have individually been willing to pay for their facts.
As Yochai Benkler puts it:
[U]sers would underinvest in buying uses currently in the public domain
because these productive uses have high positive externalities. Users who
use public domain information as an intermediate product to producing
other information goods will buy permission to use newly enclosed information only if their private benefits outweigh the private costs to vendors of
permitting the transformative use. This would leave information underutilized in all instances where the social benefits of a transformative use of information outweigh the private costs to the sellers, but the private benefits to
transformative users do not.
Benkler, supra note 17, at 434; see also Cohen, supra note 94, at 551-59 (discussing
ways in which a purely economic model of social welfare fails to capture important
139

values); Netanel, supra note 34, at 311 (criticizing a wholly market-based model that
"errantly reduces complex issues of public policy to readily assessable bilateral transactions, glossing over intractably external social benefits and costs of market actor
decisions").

140 See Charles Taylor, Irreducibly Social Goods, in RATIONALITY, INDIVIDUALISM AND
PUBLIC POLICY 45, 48-54 (Geoffrey Brennan & Cliff Walsh eds., 1990) (describing
social good, the value of which derives from collective decisionmaking rather than the
sum of individual preferences); see also Cohen, supra note 94, at 551 ("[T]he correct
question to ask is not whether the proposed changes in digital intellectual property
rights will increase the value realized by markets [but] whether the changes will in-
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Second, information is nonrival; restrictions on access to it therefore
create a welfare-reducing deadweight loss. Finally, owners of information goods often enjoy significant market power.' 4 1 They are thus less
likely to respond to consumer preferences than producers in a more
competitive market would be. 14 2 For these reasons, intellectual property rights are generally limited in time and scope; they are far different from the comparatively absolute property rights we see in
competitive markets for rival goods.
These disadvantages of the purely free-market approach suggest
that the notion of encouraging absolute architectural control of
databases is a lemon. There is, however, an economic theory that sees
this market power as a chance to make lemonade: price discrimination. Under price discrimination theory, absolute architectural control can be a help, not a hindrance, to the optimal production and
dissemination of databases and other information goods. 143 A producer of information goods tends to price its goods above their marginal cost, either because it needs to recover its up-front development
expenses or because it is seeking monopoly rents, or both. 144 Such
pricing poses a problem for low-value users, those who would pay
more than marginal cost but who cannot or will not pay the price that
the producer charges-for example, a penurious scientific researcher
or a tightfisted law professor. Keeping the good out of such a user's
hands constitutes a deadweight loss, a reduction in overall social welfare (particularly when use of the good would produce positive externalities in the form of progress in science or education).
Area DEF in Figure 1 represents the deadweight loss under this
pricing model. The producer sets a price that maximizes profits,
which is the price at which the revenue from making one additional
unit would be less than the cost of producing that unit. Consumers
who value the good at a price lower than the profit-maximizing price
but higher than the marginal cost (i.e., the consumers in Area DEM
crease the overall value realized by society-including the value realized both within
and outside markets-under the current system.").
141 See infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
142 SeeJulie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1812
(2000) ("Market power ... decreases the likelihood that irrational, misguided, or
rationally self-centered but socially inefficient licensing decisions will be subject to
market correction."); see also Cohen, DRM, supra note 19, at 614-15 (discussing why
market forces alone will not lead to optimal architectural standards for privacy protection). Also, the market for consumer goods corrects price iniquities much better than
it protects other aspects of mass-market transactions. Cohen, supra note 94, at 488.
143 This explanation derives from Michael Meurer's article on price discrimination in copyrighted digital goods. See Meurer, supra note 81, at 876-93.
144

See Green, supra note 64, at 927-29 (discussing monopolization costs).
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do not buy the good. This represents a socially inefficient deadweight
loss because those consumers are willing to pay more than the cost of
producing the good, yet do not obtain it. On the flip side, Area ACED
represents a welfare gain, split between consumers who are willing to
pay more than the profit-maximizing price (the consumer surplus of
Area ABD) and the seller (the producer surplus of Area BCED).
In a world without significant architectural controls, one could
redress the deadweight problem through limits on legal entitlements
(contractual or otherwise), such as restricting a producer's rights in
the aftermarket, permitting value-adding noncompetitive uses, and
setting a time limit on the exclusive rights. This is how copyright law
handles deadweight loss. 14 5 But when a producer is able to employ
extralegal constraints to control its information good, limits on legal
entitlements are of less consequence. 14 6 A product that is only available online in de-reified form has no aftermarket. The right to fair use
is fairly useless without the means to access. Copy protection software
does not expire.
This description of the deadweight problem, however, presumes
a unitary pricing scheme. If a database developer were somehow able
145 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a) (2000) (codifying the first sale doctrine); id. § 107
(codifying the fair use doctrine); id. § 302 (providing for expiration of exclusive
rights). The extent to which individual contractual agreements can override copyright's deadweight solutions is an open and hotly contested issue. See, e.g., O'Rourke,
supra note 104, at 487-500 (discussing distribution models under the Copyright Act).
146 See Cohen, supra note 8, at 1140 (noting that a legal right to breach a proexpansionist contractual term "may count for little in the face of self-enforcing technological protection").
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to charge each user the price that that user would be willing to pay,
the deadweight problem would disappear. Our penurious scientist
could pay a few dollars for a database that would cost Megabucks Corporation thousands more. Figure 2 depicts such an individualized
pricing model.
FIGURE
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In this model, the database developer has set prices m through r
for the individual users who are willing to pay those prices. This both
reduces the amount of deadweight loss and converts much of what
had been consumer surplus into producer surplus. 14 7 The latter effect is neither here nor there from the standpoint of overall social
welfare, except insofar as the added profits give the producer a
needed incentive to invest in the creation of the good.' 48 The former
effect, however, is welfare-enhancing.
Price discrimination of this sort is possible only when three conditions are satisfied. First, the seller must be able to block any attempts
147 In a world of perfect price discrimination, all the consumer surplus and deadweight loss would be eliminated, and the entire Area ]KL would be producer surplus.
148 See Green, supra note 64, at 928 (noting that an information producer who
"charges a price that is no higher than what is necessary to cover production costs...
is not earning monopoly rents"); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 212, 226 n.46 (2004) (pointing out that portraying entire producer surplus as profit "overstate [s] the degree of profit by ignoring the role of fixed
costs"). But see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HAIv. L. REV. 281, 286 (1970) ("It is not

apparent that the producer has any stronger claim to the surplus than the consumer
.. ..
.).
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at arbitrage. 149 In other words, if our penurious scientist can sell his
or her low-cost copy of the database to Megabucks Corporation, the
database developer will not be able to charge Megabucks the significantly higher price that it would otherwise be willing to pay. Second,
the seller must obviously have the ability to find out which consumers
are willing to pay what price.15 0 Database developers can use technology to fulfill both of these conditions. They architecturally constrain
arbitrage by controlling access to their databases through an online
network (i.e., selling a service rather than a good) 1 51 and by building
anti-alienability technologies into those databases that are released in
freestanding formats.1 5 2 And online databases are particularly well
suited to measuring (or "metering") consumer valuations, at least
when those valuations correlate with frequency and length of
153
usage.
Finally, price discrimination requires sufficient market power on
the part of the producer-a lack of competition. A producer in a
competitive industry confronts elastic demand and thus a flatter demand curve that does not allow for price discrimination. 5 4 Scholars
typically assume that owners of intellectual property rights have the
149 Meurer, supra note 81, at 874-76.
150 Id. at 871-74.
151 Id. at 875 (discussing limiting arbitrage in copyrighted goods).
152 See Michael Higgins, DisappearingData: That CD-ROM May Self-Destruct If You
Don't Check the ExpirationDate, 84 A.B.A. J. 30, 30 (1998) (describing a CD-ROM that
becomes unreadable after a certain period of time and requires renewal to become
readable again).
153 See Meurer, supra note 81, at 873-74 (discussing metering for copyrighted
goods). Edmund Kitch argues that when a producer switches from selling its information good in freestanding format to selling it online (in order to meter usage per time
unit), it is not engaging in price discrimination-i.e., it is not selling the same product to different customers at different prices. Instead, it is selling a different product
altogether: a minute (or hour or second) of access to the information good rather
than the good itself. Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic
Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1733-34 (2000); see also LANDSBURG, supra note 29, at 365-66 (noting that "almost everything that appears to be
price discrimination admits at least one alternative explanation" and "economists who
are disinclined to believe in substantial monopoly power" tend to believe these alternatives). Kitch is correct that unless the price of the time unit of access varies depending on the willingness of the user to pay more or less for that unit, all the seller has
done is change the kind of good represented by the X-axis in Figure 1. But the architecture of the Internet and other computer networks is sophisticated enough to do
more than blindly charge each user the same price per minute. Lexis and Westlaw,
for example, use sign-on software that is able to distinguish me from a real lawyer, and
they consequently engage in price discrimination by giving me free access while
charging others considerably more for the same time units.
154 LANDSBURG, supra note 29, at 356; Meurer, supra note 81, at 870.
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market power to price discriminate because of the exclusive nature of
their entitlements-they have a monopoly over their information
goods. 155 The meaning of the term "monopoly" here, however, is
more colloquial than economic. 56 Exclusive rights in a good do not
necessarily translate into an absence of competition from near-perfect
substitutes. 15 7 If John Grisham is charging $30 for his latest legal
thriller, his exclusive copyright prevents us from obtaining the book
from him for less-but competitor Scott Turow may seize the opportunity to sell us his new novel for $20.
Nevertheless, one tends to encounter a monolithic, standardform approach to marketing goods in the information industry, rather
than intense competition and flexibility regarding legal and architectural constraints. 158 This is particularly true in markets for latter-day
155 E.g., Cohen, supra note 142, at 1801 (noting that access restrictions allow copyright owners to charge higher prices); Fisher, supra note 77, at 1234 (describing the
owner of a copyright as a monopolist who can price discriminate); WendyJ. Gordon,
IntellectualProperty as PriceDiscrimination:Implicationsfor Contract, 73 CH1.-KENT L. REV.
1367, 1381-82 (1998) (discussing monopolies in the context of database owners); see
also Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 327 n.4 (assuming a downward-sloping demand curve).
156
In ordinary speech, to monopolize or to have a monopoly can mean to have
exclusive or dominant possession of something-as in "he monopolized the
conversation." This meaning of the term 'monopoly' is not the same meaning as economic monopoly-to have the exclusive right to sell into a market
without competition.
Kitch, supranote 153, at 1735 (challenging the common assumption that intellectual
property rights confer monopoly power).
157 Boyle, supra note 53, at 2018 ("The question of whether a monopoly exists is
one that is determined by the availability of substitute goods, not the shape of the
legal entitlement."); see alsoYoo, supra note 148, at 236-46 (outlining an approach to
copyright that focuses on the role of imperfect but economically relevant substitutes
in mitigating monopoly effects).
158
Although a copyright does not necessarily guarantee market power, many
information goods lack perfectly fungible substitutes. Even absent a commanding market share, market power may inhere in standard-form terms
that are widely adopted within an industry. Such terms are increasingly common in information markets, and despite considerable evidence that information consumers want greater freedom, the major copyright owners do not
seem to be competing among themselves to offer less restrictive terms.
Cohen, supra note 142, at 1811 (footnotes omitted); see also Cohen, supra note 94, at
530.
[I]t would seem entirely reasonable to hypothesize that once copyright owners have developed reliable technologies and reached sufficiently broad consensus on the level of control to be implemented, consumers may have
difficulty using their 'power to switch' to obtain substantial or qualitative
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information goods, which do not have to battle preexisting consumer
expectations about access and use formed in the era before significant
de-reification. Perhaps the music industry faces consumers who want
their de-reified products to resemble old vinyl records in their portability, if not in their fragility; music marketed over the Internet in architecturally restricted formats has certainly had a rough start, with
end-user control over the good a seemingly major determinant of a
service's success. 159 But the comparatively young software industry
consistently imposes restrictive mass-market click-wrap licenses on its
customers, who never learned to expect anything more. The same
will probably be true for the equally young digital databases industry.
This level of control bespeaks a market that, even if it falls short of
pure economic monopoly, has a demand curve that slopes downward
160
sharply enough for price discrimination to be feasible.
change-even if many consumers dislike rights management technologies
and fractional usage rights and believe that they would derive increased utility from decreased author/owner control.
Id.; id. at 521-22 & n.222 (discussing a legal database market characterized by uniformity of, rather than competition over, terms of access). The lack of competition
over licensing terms may result in part from consolidation in media ownership; as of
1997, fewer than twenty companies controlled almost all the country's media outlets.
Gimbel, supra note 100, at 1685 (citing Molly Ivins, Free Press Isn't Easy in Corporate
America, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, July 22, 1997, at A4); see also Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organizationof Information Production, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 81,

93-95 (2002) (arguing that strong intellectual property entitlements lead to increased concentration and homogenization of information production); Frank
Ahrens, FCC Eases Media Ownership Rules, WASH. POST, June 3, 2003, at Al (detailing
the Federal Communication Commission's controversial relaxation of rules restricting ownership of multiple media outlets in the same market).
159 The availability of free pirated music via the descendants of Napster may have
something to do with the troubles legal music services have experienced. Yet Apple's
iTunes online music store, which offers users significantly more downloading and
copying freedom than its existing rivals, has been thriving; it produced more music
downloads on its first day than had occurred through other legal services in the previous six-month period. Leander Kahney, Music Biz Buzzing Over ITunes, WIRED NEWS,
May 2, 2003, at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,58706,00.html. This
is particularly impressive given that the iTunes service then worked only on computers using the Apple Macintosh platforn, id., leaving the far more numerous
Microsoft Windows users out in the cold. See Peter Lewis, Apple Puts the Eye in IM,
FORTUNE, July 21, 2003, at 159, 160 (noting that the Windows operating system outsells its Macintosh rival by more than ten to one).
160 See Meurer, supra note 81, at 870 (noting that "a firm does not have to be a
monopolist to price discriminate"). The potential for monopolistic pricing in the
database market is particularly high in the case of sole-source databases, which are
unlikely to have adequate substitutes. See infra notes 175-85 and accompanying text;
see also Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 70 (observing that anecdotal evidence in the market for scientific databases indicates an absence of competition).
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Databases thus appear to be promising candidates for welfare-enhancing price discrimination. If this is true, technolegical measures
that thwart database developers' ability to exercise absolute architectural control over their products would be counterproductive, and
even playing defense in the technolegical wars against the pro-expansionists would be wrongheaded. Indeed, price discrimination's bestknown advocate, William Fisher, has suggested that the law governing
information goods should encourage the practice, although in his
analysis the role of both the technological and the technolegical was
subsumed within an examination of the role of contract law, and he
focused on existing intellectual property entitlements. 161 Many of the
criticisms of Fisher's approach are nevertheless relevant to the question of what technolegical measures, if any, should be put in place in
the database market.
Several of Fisher's critics question price discrimination's effect on
information innovation. The cost of information output is partly a
function of the cost of information input. 162 The higher producer
surplus that price discrimination produces will therefore not necessarily translate into higher producer profits, because the producer may
be paying more for the information goods that form the basis for its
product. This means that price discrimination may not provide any
additional incentive for the discriminator to create its goods, to innovate. 163 At the same time, the increased producer surplus is generated
largely at the expense of a consumer surplus that high-value users
would have otherwise enjoyed. But that consumer surplus may have
helped those high-value users produce positive externalities, and they
161 See Fisher, supra note 77; see also Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 170 ("There is a
user right to copy facts, but a flexible pricing scheme may make the restriction [of
that right] reasonable."); O'Rourke, supra note 104, at 545-51 (proposing alienability
of fair use rights in software licensing except when it has an anticompetitive effect);
Yoo, supra note 148, at 270-71 (arguing that promoting price discrimination will encourage the emergence of competing information goods).
162 See Benkler, supra note 33, at 553 (discussing input costs in the context of a sui
generis database right); Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 336-39 (discussing input
costs in the context of copyright law). Proponents of an intellectual property right in
data compilations sometimes fail to recognize that such a right could increase the cost
of assembling or preparing new compilations. See, e.g., Amy C. Sullivan, When the
Creative Is the Enemy of the True: DatabaseProtection in the U.S. and Abroad, 29 AM. INTELL.
PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 317, 319-22 & n.5 (2001) (lamenting the lack of protection for a
database of horse-breeding pedigrees and racehorse handicapping information that
was itself compiled using information culled from other data compilations).
163 See Boyle, supra note 53, at 2031 ("Under price discrimination, after all, producers of information goods might well be paying more for inputs than they do now
under the current leaky system, with limited enforceability of contracts of adhesion,
first sale, fair use, and so on.").
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may have been willing to pay that high value because they had some
profitable, value-added use in mind. To the extent that the consumer
surplus helped fund value-added information goods, its disappear64
ance will act as a disincentive for innovation.1
Another problem with the price discrimination model described
above is that it focuses only on those transactions that involve the producer of the information good. When one considers secondary markets for such goods, however, the existence of a deadweight loss in
Figure 1 is questionable. Under copyright law, for example, low-value
users who cannot afford an author's unitary profit-maximizing price
might acquire the book in the aftermarket that the first sale doctrine
makes possible. 165 Low-value users can buy the latest John Grisham
novel at a used book store or borrow it from their local library. The
producer of the information good does not participate in (or directly
profit from) this transaction, and thus we do not see it in Figure 1, yet
it ameliorates the socially inefficient aspect of unitary pricing. 166 Seen
in this light, architectural restrictions on alienability and arbitrage
might exacerbate, not mitigate, the deadweight loss.
A final internal shortcoming of the model is that it fails to account for the expense of implementing price discrimination, whether
through contractual or architectural means. Implementing access
and copy protections and monitoring usage involve certain transaction costS. 167 For high-value customers, these transaction costs will

probably not be prohibitive. But the potential effect on low-value
users is more ominous. The profits to be made from those who value
the good at or near its marginal cost of production are likely to be
164 Cohen, supranote 142, at 1807; see also Boyle, supranote 53, at 2032 ("To put it
simply, the assumption that increasing the pricing power of the producer increases
the amount of innovation and information produced is similar to the assumption that
increasing the level of intellectual property ights produces more innovation.").
165 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000). In other words, the deadweight loss in Figure 1
exists "only if we ignore the social institutions enabled by copyright law that traditionally have provided lower-income consumers with alternative means of access to works
that they cannot afford to purchase outright." Cohen, supra note 142, at 1806.
166 Cohen, supranote 142, at 1806 (noting that price discrimination models "measure only the copyright owner's ability to make a first sale to a particular consumer
under different pricing (and legal) regimes"); see also Gordon, supra note 155, at
1372-75 (pointing out that the balancing and limitation of entitlements in intellectual property law can itself be seen as a form of price discrimination).
167 "Implementing price discrimination is costly. The producer must invest in
identifying discrete market categories that would bear different prices. It must also
take measures-technical, contractual, marketing, or any combination-to prevent
arbitrage of the good from low value users to high value users." Benkler, supra note
84, at 2072.
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minimal, especially when one considers that the marginal cost of a
nonrival information good will be zero. Therefore, no producer will
find it financially worthwhile to incur the transaction costs necessary
to sell to those low-value customers.1 68 This means that many aspects
of the good which were non-excludable before access controls were
put in place will become excludable but not commodifiable under the
price discrimination model; they will simply disappear. The lack of
access for this subset of customers is particularly troubling when one
considers the positive externalities associated with the activities of certain low-value users traditionally privileged in intellectual property
law, such as the penurious scientist, teacher, or parodist. 169
The general theory of price discrimination also suffers from the
same limitation as any economic model that determines public policy
based on consumer valuation: it does not account for the distributional starting point. Even in an economically efficient world, the ini70
tial set of entitlements-the initial distribution of wealth-matters.
Again, the impact here on low-value users is the most significant.
James Boyle puts it nicely:
Thus, for example, the glass of water is "worth" only $1 to the person dying of thirst whose wallet holds but a single dollar. Indeed,
there would be a social loss of $3 if we gave him his drink instead of
offering it to the slightly overheated rich person who would pay $4
for it.

171

Boyle also points out that information products are essentially experience goods-consumers cannot accurately value information that
is completely hidden from them until after they have already paid.
Assumptions about consumer valuation are therefore especially suspect when we are dealing with information goods, particularly when
168 Id. at 2072-73.
169 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,....
scholarship, [and] research" among favored fair uses); see also Boyle, supranote 53, at
2032 (arguing that to assess the benefit of price discrimination one must "study the
importance to innovation of that subset of information that content producers cannot
currently control, and which is available as a result at its marginal cost of zero, but
which they would be able to control under the legally sanctioned price discrimination
regime"); Cohen, supra note 94, at 498 ("[T]here is no particular reason to believe
that a new author's ability to pay for the right to use an existing work is a good predictor of the quality of the eventual result, whether quality is measured in terms of market success or by some other standard.").
170 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One Viev of the Cathedral,85 l-hARv. L. REV. 1089, 1095-96 (1972) (discuss-

ing how transaction costs and the distribution of wealth affect the choice of
entitlements).
171 Boyle, supra note 53, at 2022 n.30.
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architectural controls completely preclude any unauthorized preview172
ing thereof.
Finally, the widespread adoption of price discrimination in the
information marketplace would likely produce certain negative externalities. Foremost among these is the effect on privacy interests. A
world in which price discrimination is the marketing model for
databases and other information goods is a world in which corporations (and possibly the government) are monitoring what each of us
reads, listens to, and looks at-and how long we read, listen, and
look. 1 73 Some loss of privacy might be a price worth paying for increased production of and access to information goods, but only if the
price discrimination model could deliver on its promise. Given the
flaws in the model identified above, the case for paying that price has
yet to be made.
The foregoing discussion makes one thing clear: database developers' extralegal, architectural control over access to and use of their
products is likely to play a pivotal role in constraining behavior in the
database market. Existing and proposed pro-expansionist technolegical measures serve only to strengthen that control. And the silver lining in the cloud of increased control-price discrimination-proves
on closer examination to be tarnished. It is therefore ironic that antiexpansionists cite developers' architectural capabilities as a positive
feature of the database market-as a reason not to enact database protection legislation. 174 The better view, as we see in the following section, is that database protection legislation is the best (and perhaps
the last) real hope for a sensible policy outcome.

III.

A TECHNOLEGICAL

TOOLBOX

Database developers have a problem they don't like-market failure-and a solution that the rest of us shouldn't like-architectural
172 Id. at 2033-34.
173 "Many of the Internet's attractive features as a speech technology-its openness, its resistance to filtration by both public and private power, its anonymity-seem
like bugs rather than features from the point of view of perfect price discrimination."
Id. at 2034; see also Litman, supra note 17, at 611 ("Policing control over access and
dissemination . . . requires significant monitoring of who is using the database and
what data she is retrieving.").
174

See, e.g., HR. 354 1999 Hearing, supra note 64, at 158 (statement of Charles

Phelps on behalf of Ass'n of Am. Univs.) ("We submit that this concern is likely to be
addressed adequately by methods of protection in common use today, including technical restrictions on access and contract."); U.S. COPRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 64, at
68 (reporting that opponents of database legislation argue that "[t]echnological
means of protection are also available and effective").
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controls. A successful database policy must address both the market
problem and the architectural solution, so that the entitlements that
emerge from the debate on such issues as scope, duration, value-added products, and privileged use will have their intended effect. In
other words, any decision to enact database protection entitlements
that resemble traditional intellectual property rights must also necessarily take account of extralegal, architectural controls if its policy
goals are to be achieved. Even a decision to refrain from enacting a
database right will not have its intended effect if policymakers fail to
incorporate technolegical measures into their policymaking.
In this final part of my discussion, I identify several technolegical
tools that policymakers might use in resolving the database debate,
and will suggest that one of them-which I call re-reification-provides the best combination of efficacy and flexibility. To show why rereification is advantageous, I first review in detail one issue in the
database debate that vexes the pro-expansionists and anti-expansionists alike and that in fact represents the entire debate writ small: solesource databases. The sole-source example then serves as a basis for a
broader discussion of how technolegical tools might be used to implement other policy decisions in the database debate and why re-reification is particularly well-suited to the task.
A.

The Sole-Source Problem

One of the most troubling issues in the database debate is what to
do about data that are available from only one source. 1 75 Examples
range from financial market data, such as stock prices, to data on
fleeting natural phenomena, such as earthquake measurements cap175 I do not include within this definition data that can be independently compiled by a second compiler, but that have a market capable of handling only one
seller. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 70 (noting a lack of competition
in the market for commercially distributed databases). Such "niche" data are not
architecturally restricted in the same way as true sole-source data and thus present
entirely different questions. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT ON RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE APRIL 1998 CONFERENCE ON DATABASE PROTECTION AND ACCESS

pt. III.B.2 (1998), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/dbconf/
dbase498.htm (arguing that when a niche market can handle only one supplier even
though data are available elsewhere, database protection should apply or no one will
serve that market at all); see also Michael Freno, Note, DatabaseProtection:Resolving the
U.S. DatabaseDilemma with an Eye Toward InternationalProtection, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
165, 206-07 (2001) ("Congress should define 'publicly accessible' data as data the
public can obtain through reasonable diligence from a printed or electronic source
that is open and free to the public or obtainable, as individual items of data, through
inexpensive research.").
ISSUES
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tured by only one researcher.' 7 6 Because the data source either is
controlled by a single, private party or has disappeared, sole-source
data present a more serious market problem than databases incorporating publicly available data-a fact that parties on both sides of the
database debate recognize.

i 77

More specifically, the problem with sole-source data is that they
are impervious to one of the safeguards that all participants in the
debate acknowledge as crucial: independent collection. Even the
most diehard pro-expansionist recognizes that database developers
can lay claim only to the effort they put into compiling the data,
rather than to the data themselves. 178 A second developer is accordingly free to market a competing database as long as it assembles the
data by consulting the original sources, rather than by copying the
data from the first database.1 79 This notion of independent collection
176 Collections of Information Antipiracy Act and Vessel Hull Design ProtectionAct: Hearing on H.R 2652 and H.R. 2696 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 60 (1997) (statement of J.H. Reichman).
177 See, e.g., Statututory Protectionfor Databases:Economic & Public Policy Issues: Hearing on H.R. 2652 and H.R. 2696 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the
House Comm. on theJudiciary, 105th Cong. 85 (1997) [hereinafter Protectionfor Databases
Hearing] (statement of Laura D. Tyson & Edward F. Sherry, Members, Info. Indus.
Ass'n), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/41118.htm; H.R. REP. No. 106349, at 33 (1999); L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in the New Millennium: Resolving the Conflict Between Property Rights and Political Rights, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 711 (2001);
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 70-71.
178 E.g., Protection for Databases Hearing, supra note 177, at 83-85 (statement of
Laura D. Tyson & Edward F. Sherry, Members, Info. Indus. Ass'n) (recognizing that
those arguing for statutory database protection would apply it only to the database
and not the underlying data); accord Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. § 4(a) (2003); Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. § 103(a) (1999); Collections
of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 1403(c) (1999); Collections of
Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. § 1203(b) (1997); Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th Cong.
§ 5(b) (1996). No one has suggested that a database right should be modeled on
patent law's grant of protection against even those who independently produce the
same good. Rather, the models for all the database proposals have been copyright law
and misappropriation law. See, e.g., Consumer Access to Information Act of 2004,
H.R. 3872,108th Cong. § 2 (2004); H.R. 3261 § 3; H.R. 1858 § 102; H.R. 354 § 2; H.R.
2652, § 2; H.R. 3531 § 4; Pollack, supra note 17, at 123-44 (examining the interplay
between copyright and misappropriation law and the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 139-45 (discussing
the unfair competition approach); see also supra note 69 (discussing copyright-like sui
generis proposals posing as misappropriation proposals).
179 The extent to which the second developer could use the first database to verify
or guide its efforts is an open question from the pre-Feist era. See Robert A. Gorman,
Copyright Protectionfor the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1569,
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is a direct descendant of the independent authorship defense to copyright infringement actions discussed in Part I.B, and indeed independent collection was a copyright defense in the days when the sweat-ofthe-brow doctrine still provided copyright protection to databases.' s0
The possibility of independent collection acts as a check on what
might otherwise become true monopoly power over information. 18 1
The independent collection safeguard, however, loses its effectiveness when data have only one source and that source is controlled
by one database developer. 182 If our penurious researcher is studying
1585-89 (1963) (arguing that "slipping"-the practice of relying on an existing
database to verify independently verified facts-should be legal under copyright law);
Ginsburg, supra note 40, at 1931-32 (discussing how compulsory licensing may address slipping); Ira Lurvey, "Verifying" From PriorDirectories- "FairUse" or Theft? Delicate
Distinctionsin the Protectionof Copyrighted Compilations, 13 BULL. COPMGHT Soc'v U.S.A.

271, 271-72 (1966) (suggesting a "graduated" standard for slipping cases); see also
Nat'l Research Bureau, Inc. v. Kucker, 481 F. Supp. 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding
that slipping constitutes copyright infringement); Jewelers' CircularPubl'g Co. v. Keystone

Publishing Co., 274 F. 932, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), affd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922) (L.
Hand, J.) ("Every one concedes that a second compiler may check back his independent work upon the original compilation, but there has been some dispute whether
he may use the original compilation after simply verifying its statements, or whether
he must disregard the assistance of the original, except in subsequent verification.").
180 See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text; see also Banks v. McDivitt, 2 F.
Cas. 759, 760 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 961) (noting that "the subsequent investigator
must investigate for himself, from the original sources which are open to all," in order
to avoid copyright liability).
181 See supranotes 154-60 and accompanying text (discussing market power in the
database industry). In copyright law, this check may be of constitutional significance.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) (noting that the availability of
facts in the public domain is one of copyright's "built-in First Amendment accommodations"). For this reason, some scholars have questioned whether Congress could
enact database rights without running afoul of free speech constraints, even if the
Intellectual Property Clause does not provide the jurisdictional hook. See supra note
75. The constitutional question is, however, irrelevant to private architectural controls on database products; they would not implicate the First Amendment-which
regulates only state action-even though they might achieve technologically what the
government could not achieve legislatively.
182 Even if multiple sources exist, one source may have an innate advantage that
will allow it to monopolize the market despite the possibility of independent collection. For example, the database owner in Feist, Rural Telephone Service, collected
telephone directory data in the course of running a profitable, government-sanctioned utility. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 343 (1991).
These data were theoretically available for independent collection by rival directory
publishers like Feist, which could have gone door-to-door to gather names, addresses,
and telephone numbers. But such independent collection would have been prohibitively expensive, given Rural's much cheaper, government-sanctioned access to the
same information. Even staunch advocates of strong database rights concede that
Rural is a poor poster child for their cause. See, e.g., Protectionfor DatabasesHearing,
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daily temperature variances in Seattle, any number of publicly available sources can provide the necessary data. But if he or she is interested in historical hourly variances, or in the influence of sunspots on
atmospheric temperature, then there may be only one source through
which the data may be accessed.1 8 3 Sole-source data therefore give
rise to monopoly concerns. Because of these concerns, some commentators have questioned whether sole-source databases should be
84
Pro-expansionists respond
included within a database entitlement.'
that sole-source data may go uncollected and thus disappear if
database developers do not have a sufficient incentive to collect them,
and that an entitlement may be the only way to provide that incentive. 185 But excluding sole-source data from a new entitlement is only
supra note 177, at 71 (statement of Laura D. Tyson & Edward F. Sherry, Members,
Info. Indus. Ass'n) ("When data is generated by a government-created monopolist, it
is not appropriate to allow the monopolist to control database products building on
that data."). So the question is not just whether sole-source data are publicly available-that is, can be independently compiled by another database developer-but
whether the data can be independently compiled with approximately the same effort
expended by the first developer. The method of collection may be proprietary, even
if the data are not.
183 Some defenders of expansive database protection have suggested that the solesource problem is overstated, because even when certain data are available from only
one source, similar data that are 'ijust as good" might be available elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Protectionfor DatabasesHearing,supra note 177, at 85-87 (statement of Laura D. Tyson

& Edward F. Sherry, Members, Info. Indus. Ass'n) (arguing that new entrants to the
market can gather data from the same sources that the original used). The idea that
exclusive property rights are contingent on the availability of equivalent property-acquiring opportunities for others is as old as Locke's "as much and as good" proviso.
See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 288 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (defending private appropriation of property "at least where
there is enough, and as good left in common for others"). But there will certainly be
many instances in which there is no satisfactory alternative to a certain set of solesource data.
184 E.g., Freno, supra note 175, at 206-07 (arguing that statutory protection
should require a sole-source proprietor to prove that the extracted information was
available from another source in a suit for piracy); Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 175
(arguing that the public interest in a variety of information sources may preclude
statutory protection for sole-source databases); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 17, at
808-09 (noting that statutory protection would prevent new entrants into a market
already dominated by a sole-source provider).
185

E.g., Protection for Databases Hearing, supra note 177, at 85-87 (statement of

Laura D. Tyson & Edward F. Sherry, Members, Info. Indus. Ass'n) (noting that the
possibility of replication destroys the incentive to collect historical data that would
otherwise be lost). Certain sole-source databases may in fact be better candidates for
intellectual property protection than databases that draw on publicly available information, because some types of sole-source data will be lost forever absent an incentive
to collect them immediately-for example, data that measure and record natural phe-
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half the issue; the other half is how the law should regulate architectural constraints that could otherwise undo the entitlement decision.
The problem of sole-source databases, after all, is inherently architectural. Access to the data themselves is physically excludable.
Such total excludability results in more serious market monopoly potential because those who want to use sole-source data have no way of
physically obtaining the data except through a single database developer. And this problem exists regardless of where the legal entitlement lies-with the public or the developer. Moreover, existing legal
modalities reinforce the developer's ability to retain architectural control over the data. For example, trespass law gives legal backing to
physical constraints on access that the developer can put in placefences, safes, and so forth. Trade secret law serves a similar
technolegical function by granting its protection to those who have
already taken steps to keep their information secure through architectural measures,1 6 much as the DMCA gives legal backing to technological means of controlling copyrighted works. 18 7 But safes would be
safe even without trade secret and trespass law, and copy protection
software would protect software against copying even if the DMCA
had never been enacted.1 8 8 In both cases the legal protections merely
strengthen a preexisting architectural condition of secrecy.
Of course, architectural control that depends on secrecy is compromised if the database is published. For some databases, this is not
an issue. If the sole-source data have a commercial value that would
be lost upon publication and could not feasibly be recovered through
user fees, the developer will not market the database even with the
protection of a strong sui generis entitlement; the database has more
value as an internal secret than as an external commodity.' 8 9 But
nomena. On the other hand, when data (sole-source or otherwise) are acquired in
the course of an activity that provides its own incentive, no legal or architectural excludability is needed. The telephone company in Feist, for example, collected the
names and numbers of its customers in order to provide them with telephone service,
not to publish them in a directory. Feist, 499 U.S. at 343; see also Pollack, supra note
17, at 52 (noting that the telephone company "had not really sweated" and that Feist
"was a clear case of a government-protected monopolist attempting to prevent a com-

petitor from marketing a value-added product in a downstream market category").
186 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1 (4) (ii) (amended 1985) (conditioning protection on efforts to maintain secrecy).

187 See supra Part II.C.1.
188 See Burk & Cohen, supra note 19, at 82 ("Even facial invalidation of anti-circumvention legislation . . . will not prevent private publishers from implementing
rights management systems.").

189 Even if the developer later decides to publish, legal or architectural excludability at that point would be counterproductive because the database's internal value
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even for those sole-source databases that the developer develops for
the purpose of bringing them to market, publication does not necessarily require forgoing all the architectural constraints that create the
sole-source problem. As discussed above,1 90 databases can be and are
marketed in such a way that comprehensive access to the data is still
excludable.
So the sole-source problem does not necessarily go away when the
database is published. Those who would use the database are thus at
the mercy of the one developer who controls it; they must pay (if they
can) whatever price, and accept whatever terms, that developer
chooses to set.19 ' And any attempt to circumvent the architectural
constraints that maintain the sole-source monopoly will not only carry
its own extralegal costs, but will also likely run afoul of one or more of
the pro-expansionist technolegical measures discussed above and thus
192
expose the circumventer to legal liability.
The solution to the sole-source problem therefore cannot be
found in a mere refusal to enact database protection legislation or in
the exclusion of sole-source databases from such protection, any more
than repealing the law of trespass would make fences disappear. A
developer's physical control over sole-source data creates an architectural property "right" even in the absence of a legal entitlement. Yet
most of the proposed solutions to the sole-source dilemma fail to consider the architectural. The most clearly deficient solutions are those
that merely establish an exception to a sui generis "property rule" entitlement, 193 along the lines of copyright's fair use exception. 194 One
would have already provided the incentive necessary to generate it. Any exclusive
right at the commodification stage would accordingly impose deadweight loss and
other costs on the public with no countervailing benefit. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 248 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that copyright entitlement can
lead to costs in the form of "(1) royalties that may be higher than necessary to evoke
creation of the relevant work, and (2) a requirement that one seeking to reproduce a
copyrighted work must obtain the copyright holder's permission").
190

See supra Part II.B.

191 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 66 (discussing the problem of
"sole-source data providers [that] charge monopolistic prices or oblige libraries and
research institutions to accept terms and conditions that effectively waive both the
special privileges and the fair use exceptions set out in the Copyright Act of 1976").
192 See supra Part II.B (discussing hacking); supra Part II.C.1 (discussing existing
pro-expansionist technolegical measures).
193 The notion of protecting an entitlement with a "property rule" was first articulated by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed in their seminal article The Cathedral: "An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who
wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary
transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller." Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 170, at 1092.
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commentator, for example, suggests that to prove a prima facie case
of database infringement, "the plaintiff would have to show that each
item in the database allegedly extracted or used was publicly accessible through alternative means."1 95 This is similar to a provision in the
second proposed Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, which
would have provided an affirmative defense for non-profit researchers
who extract government information that was not "publicly available
from the government or reasonably available from any other
source."1 9 6 But both of these approaches assume that an unauthorized use has occurred-that the defendant has somehow managed to
overcome the architectural constraints that the database developer
has put in place. The main threat that sole-source databases pose,
however, is that users will simply not be able to access the database or
the underlying data at all. Knowing that unauthorized use is legally
defensible is of little comfort if unauthorized access is architecturally
impossible.
For the same reason, a misappropriation or unfair competition
approach to database regulation will not solve the sole-source problem. 19 7 Misappropriation theory has as its starting point the unautho194 The fair use doctrine in copyright law relieves a defendant from liability in
certain circumstances, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000), but it provides no affirmative rights
that would help a user overcome architectural restrictions on use or access. See Kreiss,
supra note 97, at 47 (" [T] he fair use provision is a shield against a finding of infringement; it is not a sword which can be used to gain access to the work."); supra text
accompanying note 80.
195 Freno, supra note 175, at 206.
196 H.R. 354, 106th Cong. sec. 2, § 1408(c)(1)(A) (1999).
197 The legislative proposals sometimes use misappropriation language to achieve
a sui generis property right result. See supra note 69. Some commentators have suggested a true misappropriation approach to the problem. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala,
Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 885, 915-26 (1992) (discussing
the need for balance between protecting against misappropriation and allowing access to factual information); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 139-45 (arguing for a refinement of the misappropriation doctrine in InternationalNews Service v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)). They may have gotten their wish with the most
recent database protection legislation to see action in Congress: the Consumer Access
to Information Act of 2004, H.R. 3872, 108th Cong. (2004), and the Database and
Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2003).
These latest bills clearly take a "hot news" and misappropriation approach to the
database underproduction problem. See supra note 70. For contrasting views on the
role of misappropriation concepts in intellectual property law generally, compare
Richard A. Posner, supra note 74, at 621 (concluding that "the term and the doctrine
can be jettisoned, so far as intellectual property is concerned at any rate, without loss,
and should be"), and Leo J. Raskind, The MisappropriationDoctrine as a Competitive
Norm of Intellectual Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REv. 875, 876 (1991) (arguing that the
misappropriation doctrine should be invoked sparingly in intellectual property law),
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rized appropriation of some intangible good.' 9 8 A misappropriation
law's only function is to assign liability when such an appropriation
has already occurred and has caused commercial harm to the developer's market. Where extralegal means prevent the occurrence of the
appropriation, however, the question of the appropriation's propriety
never arises.
Substituting a straightforward liability rule for these property
rules does not help either. The idea behind a liability rule is that one
may override a preexisting legal entitlement by unilaterally taking
what one wants-i.e., exercising the owner's right without the owner's
consent.1 99 The law then determines compensation for the taking not
through issuance of an injunction and subsequent bargaining with the
owner, but through a monetary award set by an objective third party,
such as a court or-as is often the case in copyright law-a centralized
royalty authority.20 0 For example, federal statute grants patent and
copyright owners money damages only, instead of injunctive relief,
with Dennis S. Karjala, Misappropriation as a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 2594, 2596 (1994) (urging widespread incorporation of misappropriation principles into intellectual property law).
198 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38- (1995).
199 "Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay
an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule."
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 170, at 1092. Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky have refined the Calabresi and Melamed model to show that a hybrid
property/liability regime they call "mandatory zero order pliability rules" governs current intellectual property entitlements. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1, 39-44 (2002). In the intellectual property sphere,
Jerry Reichman has been the foremost advocate for use of liability rules. See, e.g.,J.H.
Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,94 COLUM. L. REv.
2432, 2519-55 (1994) (arguing for liability rules in lieu of continued reliance on principles of copyright and patent law); J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu:
Repackaging Rights in SubpatentableInnovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1776-97 (2000)
(arguing that a modified liability rule would cure the problems created by a property
right system); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 145-51 (arguing for a liability rule similar to that of trade secret law rather than exclusive property rights);
Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308, 2426-29
(1994) (arguing for a repository system in which database owners would be automatically compensated for secondary use).
200 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 801, 90 Stat. 2541, 2594-96
(establishing royalty tribunal); Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of
2004, H.R. 1417, 108th Cong. sec. 3, §§ 801-02 (2004) (proposing replacing royalty
arbitration panel with a full-time royalty judge and two full-time assistants); Copyright
Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, § 2, 107 Stat. 2304 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 801) (replacing royalty tribunal with ad hoc royalty arbitration
panel).
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when the U.S. government or an agent thereof engages in unlicensed
use of their entitlements. 2 01 Unless the liability rule includes some
method of ensuring access to the database, however, it will be no
more helpful to the user than the property-rule exception. The event
that triggers the liability/compensation determination is the invasion
of the entitlement by an outside party; the triggering event will accordingly not occur where architectural control over the subject of
the entitlement prevents unauthorized access and use.
These straightforward property and liability rules are unable to
solve the sole-source dilemma because they attempt to use purely legal
entitlements to solve an architectural problem. The solution again
must instead be technolegical; it must directly address both the legal
entitlement question and the architectural access question. Although
this point has escaped explicit recognition by commentators and
policymakers, one can find some technolegical tools in the academic
literature and legislative history of the various database proposals.
One such tool consists of borrowing the "essential facilities" doctrine from antitrust law to promote fair access to sole-source
databases. The essential facilities doctrine began as a means of ensuring nondiscriminatory access to key aspects of an industry's physical
infrastructure, such as railroad terminals, when owned by a single
competitor. 20 2 It has since been applied to facilities ranging from produce markets 20 3 to sports arenas. 20 4 Legislators on Capitol Hill are
particularly fond of suggesting this doctrine as a solution to the solesource database problem; it has been incorporated into several of the
database protection bills that have made it to the floor of the
205
House.
201 The U.S. Court of Federal Claims determines the amount of the monetary
award. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)-(b) (2000).
202 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 394-413
(1912). Although the term "essential facility" did not appear in a published judicial
opinion until the 1977 ruling in Hecht v. Pro-Football,Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir.
1977), Terminal Railroad is considered the case that established the doctrine. Abbott
B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, EssentialFacilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187, "1195-98
(1999).
203 See Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484,
486-88 (1st Cir. 1952) (applying the Sherman Act to defendant's refusal to allow
plaintiff to use its building located adjacent to the main freight lines).
204 See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539-40 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying
essential facilities doctrine to Chicago Stadium and the market for live professional
basketball).

205
Subsection (d) [of sec. 2, § 1405 of the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999)], deals with the relationship of
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The essential facilities doctrine has some appeal as a technolegical solution to the sole-source problem. To order a database developer to permit access by others is to directly regulate the architectural
control that causes the problem in the first place. As an antitrust doctrine, however, it focuses on promoting competition, and thus only
20 6 In contrast, those with the
applies to disputes between competitors.
greatest need and least ability to access sole-source databases are likely
to be downstream users, not competitors, and who would therefore
20 7 Moreover, the scholarnot have standing to invoke the doctrine.
ship on the doctrine even within antitrust law has been mostly critical. 20 8 This criticism has followed the doctrine in its few inroads into
this Act to antitrust law. It states that this chapter will not limit application
of antitrust laws, including those laws regarding single suppliers of products
and services. The subsection is intended to address the so-called 'sole
source' issue, involving situations where the information within a collection
is not available elsewhere for others to obtain, giving the producer of the
collection a de facto monopoly over the facts contained therein. The committee believes that an appropriate response to potential abuse, to the extent it is not dealt with by existing regulatory authorities overseeing certain
industries, can be found in the antitrust laws, which are specifically designed
to deal with such monopoly concerns. The essential facilities doctrine in
particular may be especially relevant to this issue.
H.R. REP. No. 106-349, at 33 (1999); accord H.R. REP. No. 105-525, at 19 (1998) (discussing an analogous provision in H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. sec. 2, § 1205(d) (1997)).
One of the most recent bills includes general language disclaiming any effect on antitrust law but does not contain the same sole-source-specific provision as H.R. 354 and
H.R. 2652. Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R.
3261, 108th Cong. § 6(a)(1) (2003).
206 See, e.g., Interface Group, Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1987)
(Breyer, J.) (" [I] t is difficult to see how denying a facility to one who, like Interface, is
not an actual or potential competitor could enhance or reinforce the monopolist's
market power.").
207 See Thomas v. Network Solutions, Inc., 176 F.3d 500, 509-10 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(dismissing an essential facilities claim on the ground that plaintiffs were users rather
than competitors of defendant's Internet domain name registration service).
208

See, e.g., 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW

771c

(2d ed. 2002) ("Lest there be any doubt, we state our belief that the 'essential facility'
doctrine is both harmful and unnecessary and should be abandoned."); ADAm
THIERER & CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., WHAT'S YOURS IS MINE: OPEN ACCESS AND THE

RISE OF INFRASTRUCTURE SOCLAiISM 23-35 (2003) (criticizing the essential facilities
and natural monopoly doctrines as "fundamentally flawed"); Phillip Areeda, Essential

Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 841 (1990)
(arguing against the expansion of the essential facilities doctrine); Donald I. Baker,

Compulsory Access to Network Joint Ventures Under the Sherman Act: Rules or Roulette?, 1993
UTAH L. REv. 999, 1005-06 (noting the need for clarity and limitation in the essential
facilities doctrine); Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75
GEO. LJ. 395, 397-401 (1986) (expressing doubt as to the efficacy of the essential

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 80:1

the world of intellectual property in general 209 and into the world of
data protection in particular. 2 10 Application of the doctrine to intellectual property may also raise constitutional issues under both the
First and Fifth Amendments. 2 11 In short, the reliance on the essential
facilities doctrine smacks of a vague hope that the law has somehow
already dealt with the sole-source problem rather than a serious and
rigorous attempt to find a solution.
Compulsory licensing-a subset of the liability rule approach-is
another regulatory tool that has technolegical potential. In a compulsory licensing regime, the statute leaves the owner of an entitlement
no choice but to permit its transfer to or exercise by certain qualifying
facilities doctrine); Keith N. Hylton, Economic Rents and EssentialFacilities, 1991 BYU L.
REV. 1243, 1251-66 (arguing that the essential facilities doctrine may be both contrary
to economic theory and anticompetitive); Davidj. Gerber, Note, Rethinking the Monopolist's Duty to Deal: A Legal and Economic Critique of the Doctrine of "EssentialFacilities,"74
VA. L. REV. 1069, 1071-72 (1988) (arguing that courts should find a duty to deal only
in exceptional circumstances).
209 See, e.g., Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 202, at 1218-19 (arguing that "essential
facilities principles are inherently inconsistent with intellectual property protection");
O'Rourke, supra note 104, at 546-48 (approving of the use of the doctrine in evaluating whether fair use rights are alienable in software licenses). Compare Thomas A.
Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveragingby Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1, 50-62 (1998) (arguing that the doctrine is the best tool available for ensuring that Microsoft does not unfairly leverage its dominance in the market for computer operating systems), with James B. Speta, Tying, Essential Facilities, and Network
Externalities: A Comment on Piraino,93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1277, 1280-82 (1999) (arguing
for the application of other antitrust doctrines to Microsoft instead).
210 Compare Robert Pitofsky et al., The EssentialFacilitiesDoctrine under U.S. Antitrust
Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 444-45 (2002) (urging application of essential facilities
doctrine to data on sales of pharmaceuticals in Germany), with Paul D. Marquardt &
Mark Leddy, The EssentialFacilitiesDoctrine and Intellectual Property Rights: A Response to
Pitofsky, Patterson, and Hooks, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 847, 847-48 (2003) (arguing the opposite); compare BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 719 F.
Supp. 1551, 1566-67 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (allowing an antitrust claim to proceed on the
theory that a sole-source developer's refusal to share information with a competitor
was a denial of an essential facility), rev'd on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir.
1993), with Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1295-98
(11 th Cir. 2004) (holding that neither the essential facilities doctrine nor other antitrust principles require the PGA to give a competitor access to real-time golf scores),
and Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279-85 (2d Cir. 1979)
(rejecting an attempt to use antitrust principles to secure a competitor's proprietary
business information).
211 The doctrine implicates the First Amendment because government regulation

of the expressive aspects of intellectual property can be seen as compelled speech.
Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 202, at 1240-47. A Fifth Amendment issue arises because

federally-mandated intrusion into a theretofore private essential facility can be seen as
an exercise of the government's takings power. Id. at 1223-40.
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parties in exchange for compensation determined by a third party.
Intellectual property law usually uses compulsory licenses in contexts
to be
in which the costs of negotiating individual licenses are thought
2 12 One
transaction.
welfare-enhancing
so high as to foil an otherwise
might also use a compulsory license to achieve a redistribution of
wealth or other resources that would not occur in an unregulated
21 3
market.
There is little reason ex ante to think that transactions involving a
database entitlement will generally involve prohibitively high transaction costs. Nevertheless, some scholars have suggested using compulsory licensing in the database market, perhaps with distributive goals
in mind.2 1 4 And others have embraced it as a solution to address the
2 15 But the main advantage of compulmore narrow sole-source issue.
212 See Ginsburg, supra note 40, at 1925 ("The most popular current justification
for compulsory licensing is the reduction of otherwise insuperable transaction

costs."); Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1107, 1138 (1977) ("Compul-

sory licensing will, to be sure, eliminate transaction delays."). Compulsory licenses
are therefore simply one way of using a liability rule to promote economic efficiency:
Often the cost of establishing the value of an initial entitlement by negotiation is so great that even though a transfer of the entitlement would benefit
all concerned, such a transfer will not occur. If a collective determination of
the value were available instead, the beneficial transfer would quickly come
about.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 170, at 1106 (describing when efficiency calls for a
liability rule). It is difficult to determine exactly when transaction costs are so high as
to justify compulsory licenses, but one can find such licenses in both copyright law
and patent law. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)-(d) (2000) (compulsory license for cable
television retransmission); id. § 115 (compulsory license for recording of musical performances); Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974)
(affirming denial of an injunction against patent infringement and approving the use
of a judicially-administered compulsory license instead).
213 Cf Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 170, at 1110 (" [T] he choice of a liability
rule is often made because it facilitates a combination of efficiency and distributive
results which would be difficult to achieve under a property rule.").
214 E.g., Ginsburg, supra note 40, at 1927 ("Compulsory licensing is an appropriate
means of reconciling the warring social goals of stimulating the production of information on the one hand, and ensuring its broadest dissemination on the other.");
Lipton, supra note 23, at 798 ("[D]atabase law should include compulsory licensing
provisions that allow those working in science, technology, and education to access
and use databases com [p] iled by sole providers of important scientific, technical, and
educational material.").
215 See Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 176 ("Consider... a database containing information not available elsewhere. The information provider can rely on a contract or
on technology to secure this information. But a special database statute could require
that the information provider license the data."); see also Reichman & Samuelson,
supra note 17, at 145-47 (proposing a compulsory license as part of the solution to
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sory licensing in the database debate is not that it could avoid the
costs of individual negotiations or redistribute resources. Its main advantage is its potential as a technolegical tool: it could require a
database developer to provide architectural access to its sole-source
data, in addition to permitting legal exercise of its entitlement-compulsory access as well as compulsory license. 2 16

One of the primary objections to compulsory licenses (and to liability rules in general) in intellectual property law is that they hinder
the development of efficient private collective rights organizations
that can serve the same function with less government administration. 2 17 Yet compulsory licenses can play a valuable role in setting the
default entitlements around which the parties then bargain. This role
the database problem in a market dominated by sole-source developers); John Tessensohn, The Devil's in the Details: The Questfor Legal Protection of Computer Databasesand
the Collections of Information Act, H.R. 2652, 38 IDEA 439, 479-80 (1998) (same). The
European Union considered including a compulsory license for sole-source databases
within its sui generis database directive, but its final enactment contained no such
provision. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 146.

216

See MARKJ.

DAVISON, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES

35-36 (2003) (ob-

serving that the compulsory license could create "an effective right of physical access
to the [legally protected] material").
217 See Paul Goldstein, The Private Consumption of Public Goods: A Comment on Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 21 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 204, 211
(1974).
This fact, that both buyer and seller are interested in reducing transaction
costs and in cooperating toward that end, underscores the flaw in the court's
second assumption, that if transaction costs are to be reduced the solution
must come in the form of government intervention through, say, a central
clearinghouse or compulsory licensing scheme.
Id.; Robert P. Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules: IntellectualProperty Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996) ("The lesson learned in a
number of industries is that privately established Collective Rights Organizations
(CROs) will often emerge to break the transactional bottleneck."); Robert P. Merges,
Of Property Rules, Coase, and IntellectualProperty, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994).
[I]n the presence of high transaction costs, industry participants have an
incentive to invest in institutions that lower the costs of IPR [intellectual

property rights] exchange. Thus, at least in some cases, the costly bargaining occasioned by a strong property rule leads to an administrative structure
that serves much the same function as a statutory liability rule.
Id. Note that a collective rights organization could still form under a collective licensing regime; in such a case, users would simply be in a better bargaining position than
they would occupy under a property rule approach. This has been the case in one
music licensing context: although the Copyright Act provides a compulsory license
for cover versions of published music, 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000), in practice few musicians take advantage of this license. The vast majority choose instead to obtain licenses through the Harry Fox Agency, a private collective rights organization. See
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 148 (discussing the Harry Fox Agency and
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is particularly important in the database context, where architectural
constraints give the content owners extensive control (and thus strong
bargaining power), and where the users who would be most damaged
by enactment of a new property right-like our penurious re21 8 The
searcher-would be those in the weakest bargaining positions.
need for circumvention of these constraints thus makes compulsory
licensing more attractive here than in other intellectual property contexts; it allows users to avoid the costs that arise from a database developer's imposition of overly protectionist conditions on access and use.
But other disadvantages of compulsory licensing would persist.
Compulsory licenses remove the price-setting function from the private market and substitute a comparatively inflexible, top-down pricing regime, which is inherently less sensitive to consumer tastes and
preferences. These unitary or near-unitary pricing schemes fail to distinguish between the valuable and the useless, and thus fail to encourage optimal product improvement, differentiation, and even
production. 21 9 Even if resource allocation is efficient under compulsory licensing, the transaction costs of setting rates, collecting fees,
and distributing proceeds may exceed the benefit to the licensor and
licensee groups. A cumbersome regulatory mechanism designed to
set prices and distribute proceeds may be particularly inappropriate
where the goal is to provide cost-free, unconditional access to nonprofit downstream users. For these reasons, compulsory licensing is
22 0
and
often viewed with suspicion in the intellectual property realm

may not be a panacea here. Despite the heretofore unrecognized
the likelihood of collective rights organizations developing even under a compulsory
license for databases).
218 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 153 (observing that architectural/technological capabilities make a database developer "increasingly capable of
serving 'as its own collection society, subject to no consent decrees, no membership
controls and no external regulation'") (quotingJ.H. Reichman, Electronic Information
Tools-The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 25 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. &
CoPYRIGHT L. 446, 464 (1993)).
219 Goldstein, supra note 212, at 1129 (noting that under compulsory license "the
royalties to be paid are uniform regardless of the work's individual market value"); id.
at 1135 (arguing that compulsory licenses retard investment in and differentiation
among copyrighted works).
220 E.g., Stanley M. Besen et al., Copyright Liability for Cable Television: Compulsory
Licensing and the Coase Theorem, 21 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 (1978) ("The basic thesis of this
paper is that the choice of compulsory licensing for distant signals instead of full
copyright liability will.. . aggravate the problems associated with distant-signal importation."); Goldstein, supra note 212, at 1139 ("The compulsory license solution to
computer use of copyrighted works should be accepted only with the most thorough
justification."); David Ladd et al., Copyright, Cable, the Compulsory License: A Second

Chance, COMM. & L., Summer 1981, at 3, 50.
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technolegical advantages of compulsory licensing, it may not be the
technolegical tool best suited to fix the sole-source problem.
B.

The Re-Reification Solution

The sole-source issue is really a microcosm of the database debate
as a whole. Architectural control over a sole-source database differs
only in degree from architectural control over a database comprising
publicly available data. In both cases, architecture can help preserve
the developer's incentive to produce and disseminate the database.
But in both cases, architecture also imposes significant costs on anyone who wants to use the data without the developer's consent. For
databases in general, architectural restrictions obviate the safeguards-such as limited duration and privileged use for value-added
uses-that intellectual property law uses to strike the balance between
private incentive and public benefit. For sole-source databases, architectural restrictions have the same effect, and in addition preclude
welfare-enhancing competition. Any resolution of either the narrow
sole-source problem or the broader database issue will therefore need
to focus directly on regulating those aspects of technology that impose
these costs and that threaten to undermine whatever balance of legal
entitlements emerges from the database debate. The tool needs to be
technolegical.
While the essential facilities doctrine and compulsory licensing
have some attractive technolegical features, we have already seen why
they might not be the best tools in our toolbox. We can also quickly
dispense with two other technolegical measures that would directly
regulate architecture in the database market. At one end of the spectrum we have the extreme pro-expansionists' dream: the law could
give legal backing to database developers' architectural ability to constrain behavior by outlawing database hacking and associated anti-circumvention technologies. 22 1 At the other end of the spectrum, the
extreme anti-expansionists' dream: legislation that mandates removal
of technological constraints on database use and access, such as encryption, copy protection, and access controls, so that a database's
All told, the costs incurred by the interested parties and the public under the
compulsory license certainly run into millions of dollars. There are alternatives to compulsory licensing of cable secondary transmissions that can minimize transaction costs and, at the very least, eliminate public revenues being
used for government regulation.
Id.
221 As discussed supra Part II.C.1, to some extent the DMCA and CFAA already do
this and certain legislative proposals have sought to further this type of technolegical
regulation.

2004]

RE-REIFYING

DATA

contents would always be architecturally available and hacking would
be unnecessary. 222 Neither of these approaches would produce an acceptable policy outcome. If the law buttresses database developers'
architectural controls, developers will be able to dictate the terms of
database transactions-regardless of where the legal entitlements
lie-with results that will protect incentive only and thus disserve the
greater good. If the law prevents developers from employing any
technological self-help measures, the public will engage in widespread
unlicensed use, thus robbing the developer of any incentive to produce the database in the first place (and rendering any available legal
sanction toothless due to the high costs of enforcement).
These two extreme technolegical options are therefore unacceptable. The same is true of a third, more moderate possibility, which
seems at first blush to have more potential: refrain from regulating
the use of technology by either party, developer or user. This third
alternative is in reality not much more likely than the other two to
produce the optimal balance between private incentive and public
benefit. As discussed above, 22 3 if information technology is left unregulated, the winner of the battle for architectural control of databases
and other information goods is not the public, but the better technologist, and we cannot count on any correlation between that technologist's interests and overall social welfare.
We therefore need some technolegical measure that is more sensitive to the balance between private incentive and public benefit that
underlies intellectual property law. It must give meaning not only to
whatever incentivizing entitlement the legal system grants to develop222 This idea may sound radical in the intellectual property context, see Burk &
Cohen, supra note 19, at 82 (labeling as "inconceivable" the notion that Congress
would forbid the copyright content industry from using technological protection
measures), but there is nothing new about statutes that directly regulate technology,
sometimes-perhaps most of the time-in the absence of any new legal entitlement
for those affected by the regulation.
Mandatory limitations on the forms or uses of technology are equally common [as restrictions on freedom to contract]. In countless situations, we
compel persons who supply certain commodities to the public to include
specified features. Seatbelts, airbags, catalytic converters, child-proof caps,
warning labels (on cigarettes and drugs), construction features specified by
building codes or the Americans with Disabilities Act, safety features in electrical appliances-the list is endless. The persons supposedly benefited by
such features sometimes would happily do without them, but we refuse to
allow manufacturers to omit them, and we usually forbid purchasers to disable them.
Fisher, supra note 77, at 1242-43.
223 See supra Part II.B.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 80:1l

ers, but also to whatever safeguards the law imposes as limitations on
that entitlement. The design of the optimal technolegical measure
therefore depends to some extent on what precise balance the law
strikes in the entitlements sphere. How broad would a database entitlement be? How long would it last? What unlicensed uses would the
law excuse as privileged?
Although there exists some unanimity on these issues, in that
most commentators recognize the need for both an entitlement and
certain limitations thereon, there is a great deal of disagreement
about the specific answers to these questions. 224 This combination of
unanimity and disagreement has three important implications. First,
Congress is likely to enact some database protection regime. Second,
the enactment will probably be a complicated composite, incorporating not only an incentivizing entitlement, but also categorical exceptions, privileged uses, durational limitations, and so forth. Third, the
precise boundaries of the entitlement and its exceptions will be subject to frequent legislative and judicial adjustment after the fact, as the
legal system adjusts to the theretofore unknown property right.
These implications in turn have consequences for the development of the appropriate technolegical tool. In order to be sensitive to
any newfound legislative balance between private incentive and public
224 For a sample of the varied proposals suggesting some database entitlement but
disagreeing as to its details, compare Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 17, at 56
(proposing unfair competition or liability principles to protect databases, rather than
property rights), with Pollack, supra note 17, at 49-50 (supplying a redraft of the
Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1997)), with
Freno, supra note 175, at 167 (arguing for a balance between promoting incentives
and international protection for American database makers and preventing data monopolies in the United States), with Baron, supra note 80, at 881 (offering suggestions
for protection based on early copyright principles), with Kajala, supra note 197, at
893 (arguing for copyright based on misappropriation), with Protection for Databases
Hearing, supra note 177, at 74 (statement of Laura D. Tyson & Edward F. Sherry,
Members, Info. Indus. Ass'n) (arguing that statutory protection is necessary), with
Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531,
104th Cong. § 2 (1996) (protecting database makers who made "a substantial investment ...in the collection, assembly, verification, organization and/or presentation of
the contents of the database"), with Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R.
2652, 105th Cong. § 1201 (1997) (protecting database makers against misappropriation), with Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 1402
(1999) (same), with Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, H.R.
1858, 106th Cong. § 102 (1999) (prohibiting the sale and distribution of duplicated
databases that another user created), with Database and Collections of Information
Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003) (guarding against unlicensed duplication of databases), with Consumer Access to Information Act of 2004,
H.R. 3872, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004) (prohibiting database misappropriation).
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benefit in the database market, the tool of choice must be flexible
enough to allow for a diverse and detailed range of protean policy
choices. This means that high-tech, code-intensive technolegical regulation is unlikely to succeed. For example, if a database developer
were to use copy protection software in its products, the law could
require the software to incorporate the legal limitations on the developer's entitlement. Under this form of regulation, then, a developer
could only use copy protection code if that code inhibited free-riding
copyists but allowed copying by statutorily privileged users-and the
code's restrictions would have to expire altogether when the term of
225
legal protection ended.

Even if one assumes that such code would not become obsolete
over the life of the entitlement, this approach would require
reprogramming whenever legislation or court decisions altered the
public-private balance. Perhaps more important, certain aspects of
the legal regime would resist reduction to code. Suppose that (as
seems likely) a database enactment were to include some analog of
copyright's fair use doctrine-the prototypical example of privileged
use in intellectual property law. Whether conduct qualifies as fair use
is "irreducibly a situation-specific determination" that does not lend
itself to ex ante resolution in any context, and particularly not within
the limitations of computer programming. 22 6 A technolegical tool
that requires producers of information goods to code for all the legal
2 27
niceties of a legal regime holds little promise.
The best solution, therefore, would not use digital architecture to
fight digital architecture. Rather, it would remove architectural restrictions from the picture altogether. Architecture's excessive influence on behavior here is a direct result of information's dereification-i.e., its separation from the fixed, physical res in which it
resided in the print era. Data reified on a printed page are architecturally free for the taking, constrained only by legal modalities. Data
de-reified in digital form, on the other hand, are subject to myriad
architectural restrictions on use and copying. The key to successful
225

For an example of this kind of high-tech technolegical tool in the copyright

context, see Deirdre Mulligan & Aaron Burstein, Implementing Copyright Limitations in
Rights Expression Languages, in DIGIAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 137 (Joan Feigenbaum

ed., 2003) (detailing a species of technological protection that would allow the exercise of both producers' and users' legal entitlements).
226 Burk & Cohen, supra note 19, at 55.
227 A technolegical tool that relied heavily on code would also be vulnerable to
hacking, which would once again present the danger that legal entitlements would
take a back seat to architecturally determined "rights." See supra notes 92-99 and

accompanying text.
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technolegical regulation, therefore, is to re-reify the database: return it
to a format that is not susceptible to the developer's architectural control at all. This purposely retrograde approach will allow law to resume its former place as the primary behavioral constraint on the
information marketplace.
To be more specific, the re-reification paradigm would require a
database developer to reduce its database to a freestanding medium
and to deposit a copy of the database in that form with a central depository. 2 28 The re-reified medium could be (and perhaps would
have to be) digital, but it would share with print media one critical
characteristic: it would lack any internal architectural protections-no
access controls, no encryption, no copy protection. The depository
would in effect hold this technologically unfettered copy as a hostage
against the developer's attempts to override the law through architectural means.
This technolegical tool would thus immediately curb the potential for database developers to exercise absolute architecturalcontrol
over sole-source data. Yet the extent to which it would limit developers' legal control would be almost entirely within the control of policymakers, who would dictate the terms of public access to the re-reified
depository copy. If the policy contemplated a strong proprietary entitlement in databases, then the freestanding version of the database
could simply be locked away in the depository until the entitlement
expired, at which point it would be made available to the public. If
the policy instead contemplated a right against wholesale, competitive
appropriation only, while privileging value-added and non-profit uses,
the legislation could immediately make the depository copy public but
limit copying therefrom. Between these two extremes exist a practically unlimited number of possibilities for implementing policy-twotiered periods of exclusivity, short but renewable terms of protection,
privileged access to the database for favored uses, adjustments to the
entitlement along the way, etc.-none of which would be meaningful
without the threshold requirement that the developer re-reify the
data.
228 The U.S. Copyright Office, which is part of the Library of Congress, currently
accepts the deposit of copyrighted works, both to enhance the Library's collection
and as part of the copyright registration process. 17 U.S.C. §§ 407, 408(d) (2000); see
also Burk & Cohen, supra note 19, at 66-67 (suggesting the Library of Congress as a
depository and clearinghouse for "escrow keys," a technolegical tool for effectuating
fair use in copyright law). Congress thus has a model for a new database depository.
Given the different purposes and uses of the database depository, however, the government might farm out this responsibility to a private agency.
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dergo frequent updating. 23 1 The re-reification scheme could require
periodic deposits of such databases, with a new term of protection be232
ginning with each deposit and covering only newly added data.

Re-reification also gives policymakers a great deal of flexibility in
addressing any fair use analog and other valued-added downstream
issues-the archetypal privileged uses. A database regime that
strongly emphasizes the importance of downstream access and low input costs could establish a legal entitlement that applies only to direct
competitors who appropriate the database wholesale, leaving the rest
of the public free to use the re-reified, architecturally unfettered copy.
Giving ingenious downstream users access to the entire database
would allow them to manipulate it in ways that the developer (and
thus the developer's architectural capabilities and restrictions) may
not have foreseen. At the other end of the spectrum, a regime that
promotes strong proprietary rights could implement a depository system that allows only non-competing scientists, researchers, and journalists to access the re-reified database free of architectural controls.
A myriad of options exists in between: a short "lead time" period of
total exclusivity followed by complete re-reification for all downstream
users, a depository system that admits all comers but requires affirmation of their non-infringing intent, access to only portions of the data
at any one time, and so forth. Regardless of the balance struck, then,
the fact that the database exists in re-reified form is key to ensuring
that privileged uses will be not an illusory legal promise but an architectural reality.
231 "Even data that nominally entered the public domain at expiry of the fifteenyear term could remain unavailable in practice if would-be users lacked means to
identify and isolate those data within the larger mix of protected and unprotected
data comprising a dynamic collection." Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 17, at 810; see
also H.R. 354 1999 Hearing,supra note 64, at 57 (statement ofJames G. Neal on behalf
of Am. Ass'n of Law Libraries) ("Where dynamic electronic databases are concerned,
the older versions, as a practical matter, may be unavailable-making the right of
access after 15 years recognized in the language, a hollow one."); Protection for
Databases Hearing, supra note 177, at 89-90 (arguing for protection of updated
databases only if developer provides older versions); Peter A. Jaszi, Some Public Interest
ConsiderationsRelating to H.R. 3531 DatabaseInvestment and IntellectualProperty Antipiracy
Act of 1996, FED. RELATIONS E-NEws, Aug. 1996, at http://www.arl.org/info/frn/
copy/peter.html ("The effective term of protection for databases would be potentially
perpetual, at least for dynamic compilations in electronic form.").
232 In contrast, the Clinton Administration suggestion that the unavailability of an
old, expired version of a database should be a defense to an infringement claim involving the new, updated version, see H.R. 354 1999 Hearing, supra note 64, at 32-33
(statement of AndrewJ. Pincus, Gen'l Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Commerce), is another
example of a legal non-solution to an architectural problem: it mistakenly presumes
that the defendant will have the technological ability to infringe in the first place.
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237

The effect of re-reification on entitlement duration and privileged uses is clear and far-reaching. Its effect on the other aspects of
the database debate is more subtle and more limited. For example,
the question of whether a database entitlement is even needed to incentivize database development is properly left to market and legal
modalities; the role of technolegical regulation would simply be to
ensure that architectural forces do not obviate whatever legal entitlements are enacted to provide the desired market incentives. Even
here, however, a depository could serve as a registry, a way of making
the entitlement available only to developers who opt in by formally
registering their products. 2 33 Those who need no incentive to develop a database and who are accordingly willing to do without the
entitlement-such as an academic researcher motivated by prestige
and salary 234-would simply not opt in. Combined with a prominent
notice requirement for those works that do opt in, then, the registry
approach would avoid giving protection to databases whose developsigers have no interest in commodification and would thus eliminate
23 5
nificant and innecessary search costs for database users.
The only downside of an opt-in regime is that it would have to
offer database developers a deal sweet enough to entice them into
surrendering their unilateral architectural controls. In other words,
the benefit of the new entitlement for developers would have to exceed their cost of implementing effective self-help technological measures. If this balance is too hard to strike, an alternative to the opt-in
approach would be to simply apply the re-reifying regime to those segments of the database market that pose the greatest architectural
threat-e.g., digital databases developed for commercial exploitation-leaving less worrisome segments free to use whatever technological controls they see fit.2 36 In any event, a world in which an opt-in
233 A number of commentators have suggested using a registry in the database
context, although not because of its technolegical advantages. See supra note 230; see
also Lipton, supra note 23, at 789 (promoting registry model because database protection should "promote commerce rather than the expression of ideas").
234 See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 331 (citing Howard P. Tuckman &Jack
Leahey, What Is an Article Worth?, 83J. POL. ECON. 951 (1975), to note that a professor
who publishes will likely receive a highter salary than one who does not).
235 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 248 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting
that copyright entitlement imposes "search costs that themselves may prevent reproduction even where the author has no objection"). Note that the opt-in depository/
registry aspect of re-reification would not resolve the incentive problem on its own,
because a developer who needed no incentive could still opt into the entitlement
absent a legal restriction that prevented him from doing so.
236 See Lipton, supra note 23, at 799 (proposing that new entitlements cover
databases "developed at least partly for commercial exploitation in identified mar-
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sweetener does not convince enough database developers to forgo architectural controls and use the new legal entitlement is still better
than a world that simply grants them that entitlement without regulating their technological options, as the current proposals tend to do.
The flexibility in setting the legal entitlements under the re-reification model demonstrates that for the most part re-reification is an
anti-expansionist measure only in a technolegical sense: it limits the
ability of producers of information goods to achieve architecturally
what they have not earned legally. It can be used in conjunction with
a regime of strong or weak intellectual property entitlements;
whatever the entitlements, re-reification will simply prevent developers from unilaterally expanding them through technological means.
The one issue on which re-reification would not be particularly flexible or policy-neutral, however, is the role of contract in the database
market. A developer's ability to extract contractual concessions from
users depends on the cost to those users of going elsewhere for the
same product. Requiring re-reification and deposit would therefore
limit the ability of database developers to obviate the public ordering
of legislative entitlements through private bargaining. The extent of
this effect would vary with the right of users to access the deposited
database before expiration of the entitlement, so in that sense it
would be flexible. And given contract law's potential to upset the balance set by a purely public ordering of entitlements, 237 this may not
kets" but not "(a) paper-based databases, (b) educational or teaching materials, (c)
scientific and technical materials not developed with the intention of commercial exploitation, and (d) compilations developed for private or personal use with no commercial intent").
237 See Benkler, supra note 17, at 430 ("Because copyright represented a federal
legislative balance between producers and users of information, state enforcement of
contracts that upset that balance was inconsistent with federal policy."); Dennis S.
Karjala, FederalPreemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYrON L. REV. 511,
518-21 (1997) (arguing that allowing contract to privately reorder the rules would
ignore the public interest that copyright balances strive to protect); O'Rourke, supra
note 104, at 538 ("As the number of software patents has increased, the collision
between private contract and public intellectual property law in the form of patent
has become increasingly apparent."); Reichman & Franklin, supra note 104, at 884
(noting that "[t]he forces driving the information-based sectors of the economy thus
tend to destabilize the relationship between state and federal laws that had previously
buttressed the national system of innovation" and predicting that whether "the traditional reliance of that system on public good uses of information can withstand the
privatizing assault on the public domain that has accompanied these phenomena increasingly depends on the extent to which state contract laws governing access to
information will validate standardized 'click on' and 'shrinkwrap' licensing agreemen ts"); see generally Symposium, Intellectual Property and ContractLaw for the Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Futureof Information
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be a serious drawback of the re-reification approach. It is, however,
an effect that the anti-expansionists will welcome more than will their
opponents.
The particular methods by which privileged users might access
the re-reified copy remain to be seen. It may be that, as the contours
of a new database entitlement become settled through legislation and
case law, the process will be partially automated-i.e., that some aspects of the private/public balance will become predictable and permanent enough to be regulable in computer code. If so, a parallel
model is found in Dan Burk's and Julie Cohen's proposal to regulate
the reach of anti-circumvention code in copyrighted works, so as to
give meaning to certain customary, limited, and therefore predictable
aspects of copyright's fair use doctrine. 2 38 Burk and Cohen acknowledge, however, that other aspects of fair use would remain resistant to
expression in code, and would require instead some human gatekeeper to make the legal determination. 239 The need for a human
intermediary is likely to be even greater in the realm of database regulation, where the new entitlement's scope will be more uncertain, and
where effective technolegical regulation will likely require implementation not only of a fair use analog, but also of durational limitations
on the entitlement.
Lastly, re-reification should be constitutionally permissible. An
analogous provision in the copyright statute requires deposit of copyrighted works with the Library of Congress 240 and has withstood attack
under the First and Fifth Amendments. 24 1 Moreover, the more recent
technolegical regulation in the DMCA and CFAA has yet to experi242
If
ence a constitutional setback, despite the pleas of some scholars.

and Commerce, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1999); Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract
Law in the Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the
Future of Transactionsin Information and Electronic Commerce, 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 809
(1998).
238 Burk & Cohen, supra note 19, at 65 (suggesting that the law encourage "the
design of rights management technologies that incorporate automatic fair use defaults based on customary norms of personal noncommercial use").
239 Id. at 65-66. Burk and Cohen propose a mechanism to implement the gatekeeper's decisions: a "key escrow" system under which the gatekeeper would provide
the fair user with the technological "key" needed to free the copyrighted work from
its anti-circumvention code. Id. at 59-65.
240 17 U.S.C. § 407 (2000).
241 Ladd v. Law & Tech. Press, 762 F.2d 809, 812-15 (9th Cir. 1985).
242 See, e.g.,
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 453-58 (2d Cir.
2001) (upholding the DMCA's anti-trafficking provisions against a First Amendment
challenge); United States v. Sablan, 92 F.3d 865, 867-69 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the lack of a mens rea requirement for the CFAA's damage element did not offend
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these pro-expansionist technolegical measures have not been held unconstitutional, it is hard to see why technolegical requirements that
counterbalance them by giving meaning to fair use and entry into the
public domain should suffer a different fate. 243

If re-reification proves useful in the database context, it could
help resolve some of the conflict between architecture and law in
other fields of intellectual property as well, most notably copyright. 24 4
The drawback here is that formalities like deposit, notice, and registration run afoul of the Berne Convention, which withholds national
treatment from any copyright regime that includes such formalities.245
They have therefore not been a significant part of U.S. law since 1988,
when the United States implemented the Convention. 246 A direct
challenge to the Berne standard would probably not succeed at this
point; the international winds are blowing toward pro-expansionist
technolegical measures, not away from them. 247 On the other hand, a
due process); 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d
1085, 1100-01 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (same); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d
1111, 1127-42 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (upholding the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions against challenge under the First Amendment and the Intellectual Property
Clause); DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 10-17 (Cal. 2003) (upholding
against First Amendment challenge an order enjoining as a trade secret the disclosure
of DVD decryption code). Scholars have repeatedly questioned the constitutionality
of the DMCA, e.g., Benkler, supra note 17, at 414-29, but no court has yet been
persuaded.
243 Note that re-reification would not require the repeal of the DMCA and CFAA.
It would, however, render them less effective, insofar as re-reified, architecturally unfettered databases would not have any access protections or authorization requirements to circumvent in the first place.
244 Patent law already has effective technolegical measures in the form of its registration and public availability requirements. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (requiring
the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to maintain a library of patents); id. § 9 (allowing the Director to furnish copies of patent drawings to the public); id. § 10 (allowing the Director to publish patents); id. § 11 (allowing the Director
to exchange patent drawings with foreign countries); id. § 12 (allowing the Director
to furnish copies of patent drawings to public libraries).
245 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Mar. 1,
1989, art. 5(2), 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, 35 ("The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights
shall not be subject to any formality .... "). But see Burk & Cohen, supra note 19, at
70-78 (arguing that their technolegical proposal for copyright fair use would comport with the international treaty obligations).
246 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853.
247 For example, the DMCA originated in two World Intellectual Property Organization treaties, although Congress went further than it had to in the treaties' implementation. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, arts. 11-12, S. TREArv Doc.
No. 105-17, at 10-11, 36 I.L.M. 65, 71-72; WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, arts. 18-19, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, at 35-36, 36 J.L.M. 76,
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return to anti-expansionist, pre-Berne formalities is in vogue these
days on the domestic front, 248 and in time their utility might garner
international appeal as well.
CONCLUSION

Lawyers naturally think in terms of legal modalities. We talk of
rights and remedies, legislation and litigation, property and liability.
In a world governed by law alone, in which the assignment of legal
entitlements settles the matter of who can do what, 249 this narrow focus is adequate. In the real world, however, other modalities govern
behavior as well, and each influences the others. 250 A legal entitlement is useless if architectural constraints prevent the entitlement
holder from exercising it. In the battle between those advocating expanded protection for information goods and those opposing such
expansion, the anti-expansionists have largely failed to see that they
must directly regulate technology if the legal rights they value so
highly-fair use, alienability, limited exclusivity-are to have meaning. Merely opposing the enlargement of intellectual property entitlements and resisting statutes like the DMCA will not return us to a
world of architecturally unfettered information goods. Only affirmative technolegical measures can do that.
86-87; Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, tit. I, 112 Stat. 2860,
2861 (1998) (listing as its title "WIPO Treaties Implementation"); see also Burk, supra
note 128, at 1103 (arguing that in enacting the DMCA Congress went beyond what
the WIPO treaties required). Fortunately, international law contains no restraint on
formalities in the database context. The only significant provision is the European
Union directive, which makes no mention of formalities. (Indeed, the one provision
in the directive that mentions non-member states-the ballyhooed reciprocity requirement-is no more than a recital in a preamble and a vague provision about
concluding treaties.)

See E.U. DatabaseDirective, supra note 65, at 77/24, 77/27.

248 See, e.g., Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. §306(a)
(2003) (requiring copyright owners to pay a one dollar fee to maintain their copyrights after fifty years have passed since publication); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE
OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD

251-52 (2001) (propos-

ing a renewal requirement); Landes & Posner, supra note 87, at 471-75 (same).
These proposals mirror the renewal formalities that copyright law imposed previous
to 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) (repealed 1976).
249 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 170, at 1090-91 (discussing assignment of
entitlements). Of course, in a world of alienable legal entitlements and no transaction costs, the initial assignment of the entitlement is significant only as a matter of
wealth distribution; the entitlement itself gravitates to he or she who values it most
highly. See Coase, supra note 24, at 2-8 (discussing the hypothetical transfer of property rights from a farmer to a cattle-raiser as the size of the herd increases).
250 The plagiarism example is a case in point: it is a social norm, but an academic
who plagiarizes will see the market for his or her services diminish appreciably.
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In particular, what has been missing from the database debate is a
recognition that a database enactment provides us with an opportunity not only to strike the right balance of legal entitlements, but also
to regulate the architectural controls that might otherwise render
those entitlements irrelevant. Digital technology has created the market problem of which database developers complain, but it has also
offered its own unfortunate architectural solution-one that would
upset the balance between private production and public benefit that
we value in intellectual property law. The most promising way to prevent this unwelcome result from coming to pass is to offer the
database industry an entitlement, but to condition that entitlement on
the abandonment of the most troublesome technological measures.
Once we remove the database from the de-reified format that makes
architectural control possible, striking the right balance of entitlements-whatever it might be-becomes feasible. We must re-reify the
data.
The intellectual property community's failure to address this issue is symptomatic of a larger oversight in the modern scholarship.
The latter-day conception of property rights has been too narrow, disdaining premodern, "might makes right" concepts like physical possession of a res in favor of a focus on legal prerogatives. 25 1 Yet
physical possession and the physical characteristics, capabilities, and
limitations of a good carry their own extralegal prerogatives that can
constrain behavior more than any legal entitlement. Those who resist
the expansion of intellectual property rights have accordingly recognized in the last several years that architecture establishes its own prerogatives. They should now realize that a realm ruled by unregulated
digital information technology may more closely resemble a "might
makes (property) right" regime than a balanced, publicly ordered set
of entitlements and freedoms.

251 See, e.g., Besen et al., supra note 220, at 78-79 ("It is reasonable to think of
property rights as involving not physical possession, but rather the prerogatives and
obligations pertaining to the use of a particular resource.") (citing Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1967)).

